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RESCUING EXPEDITED DISCOVERY FROM 
THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMMISSION & RETURNING IT TO FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(d)(1): USING A DOCTRINE’S 
FORGOTTEN HISTORY TO ACHIEVE 
LEGITIMACY 
JESSE N. PANOFF, ESQ.* 
INTRODUCTION 
A $40 trillion market1 is regulated by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC),2 a federal agency that has, during the past 
eleven years, been denied expedited discovery only twice.3  The CFTC’s 
unparalleled record is one of the primary results of expedited discovery’s 
illegitimacy.4  Illegitimacy exists because federal courts throughout the 
* Mr. Panoff practices general civil litigation in Nevada. He dedicates this Article to his 
family. 
 1 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-2015 at 3 (2011), 
available at http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2015strategicplan.pdf. 
 2 Throughout this Article, “CFTC” and “Commission” refer to the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission.  Likewise, the following terms are synonymous with “expedited discovery”: 
“early discovery,” “pre-26(f) discovery,” “accelerated relief,” “accelerated discovery,” and “the 
doctrine.” 
 3 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. UForex Consulting, LLC, 551 F. Supp. 2d 513, 
516 (W.D. La. 2008); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Chilcott, No. 2:02-CV-94-FTM-
29DNF, 2002 WL 1455345 (M.D. Fla. filed Mar. 7, 2002), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/02orders/enfchilcott-sro.pdf (omitting CFTC’s proposed expedited-discovery 
provisions from ex parte restraining order; PDF copy of order shows proposed provisions crossed 
out by court). 
 4 See Jesse N. Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery from Courts & Returning It to FRCP 
26(d)(1): Using a Doctrine’s Forgotten History to Achieve Legitimacy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 651, 672 
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country have developed5 expedited discovery—a legal doctrine—in 
ways that are inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1), 
the doctrine’s provenanc 6
According to 26(d)(1),  “[a] party may not seek discovery from any 
source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), 
except . . . when authorized by . . . court order.”7  So, discovery is 
generally prohibited before the parties conduct a Rule 26(f) discovery 
planning conference.8  An exception to this general prohibition is when 
discovery is “authorized by . . . court order.”9  Importantly, the rule does 
not specify the circumstances when a court should “authorize[]”10 
discovery.11  That determination rests with a court’s discretion,12 which 
(2011) [hereinafter Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I] (“At least since 2000, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission has obtained sweeping expedited-discovery orders under the rubric of 
good cause. These decisions rely on the same generalized justifications, rarely paying any attention 
to the details of 26(d)(1), but allowing for nearly boundless discovery.” (footnotes omitted) (citing 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kim, No. 11 CIV 1013, 2011 WL 554105, at *1, *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011)). 
 5 As used in this Article and in Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, the word 
“developed” describes the judicial process’s articulation and readjustment of a standard or a test.  
See Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 619 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is a peculiar 
virtue of our system of law that the process of inclusion and exclusion, so often employed in 
developing a rule, is not allowed to end with its enunciation, and that an expression in an opinion 
yields later to the impact of facts unforeseen.”) (emphasis added); Washington v. W. C. Dawson & 
Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The process of inclusion and exclusion, so 
often applied in developing a rule, cannot end with its first enunciation.  The rule as announced must 
be deemed tentative.  For the many and varying facts to which it will be applied cannot be foreseen.  
Modification implies growth.  It is the life of the law.”) (emphasis added); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, 
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 138 (Yale University Press 1963) (referencing Justice Brandeis’s process 
of inclusion and exclusion). 
 6 See infra Appendix I (decisions authorizing early discovery without using any interpretive 
test); see also infra Appendix IV (decisions permitting expedited discovery despite omitting any 
citation to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1)). 
 7 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 8 Id.  (“A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as 
required by Rule 26(f) . . . .”); see also Lamar v. Hammel, No. 08-02-MJR-CJP, 2008 WL 370697, 
at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2008). 
 9 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“[e]xcept . . . when authorized by . . . court order.”); see also 
Quia Corp. v. Mattel, Inc., No. C10-01902 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 2179149, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 
2010); Bug Juice Brands, Inc. v. Great Lakes Bottling Co., No. 1:10-cv-229, 2010 WL 1418032, at 
*1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2010); Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-
620, 2008 WL 2923426, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 24, 2008). 
 10 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 11 See, e.g., Lamar, 2008 WL 370697, at *3 (“There is no set test or criteria for deciding 
whether early discovery is warranted, but certainly fairness to all concerned must be a paramount 
concern.”); Better Packages, Inc. v. Zheng, No. Civ.A. 05-4477(SRC), 2006 WL 1373055, at *2 
(D.N.J. May 17, 2006) (“Unlike most other discovery provisions within the Federal Rules, these 
provisions contain little guidance regarding the granting of expedited discovery.”). 
 12 See, e.g., MRP, Inc. v. Moreman, No. 3:10-CV-707, 2011 WL 61177, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 
7, 2011); Avaya, Inc. v. Acumen Telecom Corp., No. 10-cv-03075-CMA-BNB, 2011 WL 9293, at 
*2 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2011); Russell v. Lumpkin, No. 2:10-cv-00314, 2010 WL 1882139, at *1 (S.D. 
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can be robust in the discovery setting.13  While discretion is extensive, it 
is not unlimited.14  The rule’s structure and text have boundaries that can 
and should harness discretion.15  The problem is that courts ignore 
26(d)(1)’s structure and text when faced with a CFTC request for 
expedited discovery.16 
For over a decade, judicial decisions have “authorized”17 the CFTC 
to conduct expedited discovery irrespective of 26(d)(1)’s structure and 
text.18  Instead, courts typically allow discovery because either: (i) “good 
cause” exists, or (ii) for no articulated reason at all. Consider that the so-
called Good-Cause Test merely proclaims, “[g]ood cause exists for the 
plaintiff [CFTC] to conduct expedited discovery . . . .”19  Hence, judicial 
decisions have developed the doctrine in ways that are attenuated from 
26(d)(1).  The overall result is if the Commission asks for accelerated 
discovery, then courts will grant such relief.20  This is somewhat 
unsurprising because the very decisions—the court orders—that 
“authorize”21 early discovery are written by the CFTC and signed by 
federal judges with little if any modification.22  In fact, out of 101 
Ohio May 11, 2010); Better Packages, Inc., 2006 WL 1373055, at *2; Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina, 
233 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. O’Connor, 
194 F.R.D. 618, 623 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also BlackRock, Inc. v. Schroders PLC, No. 07 Civ. 
3183(PKL), 2007 WL 1573933, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (stating that expedited discovery is 
discretionary). 
 13 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 
F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 14 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 658-59. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. People’s Alt., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-
07013-GAF-E, at 3 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 22, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfpeoplesorder
092210.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Driver, 2009 WL 3396172, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nations Inv., LLC, No. 07-CV-61058-RWS, at 
5 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 2007); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cornerstone Capital 
Mgmt., LLC, No. 07-CV-0274-RWS, at 17-18 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 2007). 
 17 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 18 Structure involves the general prohibition and discretionary exception.  Text encompasses 
specific actors, conduct, and time period. 
 19 See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. ACJ Capital, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01419-
JAF, at 3 (D.P.R. filed May 4, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfacjcapitalorde
r050411.pdf (filed under seal). 
 20 See infra Appendix I (decisions authorizing expedited discovery without using an 
interpretive test, implying the movant’s identity—the CFTC—is the determining factor). 
 21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 22 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Fin. Robotics, No. 11-CV-2446-
LR, at 2, 15 (S.D. Tex. filed June 30, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enffinroborder06
3011.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cornerstone Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 07-
3
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decisions, spanning from 2000 to 2011, not one quoted 26(d)(1), with 
some omitting it entirely.23  Courts have, therefore, within the CFTC-
expedited discovery context, trivialized and minimized the doctrine’s 
source. 
Other legal contexts have dealt with expedited discovery similarly.  
Examples include cases concerning anonymous online copyright 
infringers,24 the Fair Labor Standards Act,25 the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act,26 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.27  As with the CFTC-
expedited discovery context, these areas of law have “authorized”28 pre-
26(f) discovery with scant attention to or respect for 26(d)(1)’s structure 
or text.29  Such areas of law involve issues—including investments and 
employment—that are at the heart of this country’s recent economic 
decline.  The CFTC context, however, deals with some of the forces that 
enervated our country’s economy.30 
The forces behind the economic decline are the commodity futures 
and option markets, volatile economic sectors rife with speculators, some 
of whom have perpetrated widespread abuses ranging from market or 
price manipulations to variegated forms of fraud, costing investors and 
markets hundreds of millions of dollars.31  And now, the stakes—already 
CV-0274-RWS, at 17-18 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcornerstoneor
der.pdf. 
 23 See infra Appendix IV. 
 24 See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-4, No. 1:07-cv-1115, 2007 WL 4178641, at *1-2 
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2007); Interscope Records v. Does 1-8, No. CIVA06CV00352WDMPAC, 
2006 WL 1351876, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2006); Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-20, No. 05-CV-
2144-WDM-PAC, 2005 WL 3776346, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2005). 
 25 See, e.g., Mehmedi v. La Dolce Vita Bistro, LLC, No. 1:10 CV 01591, 2010 WL 4789579, 
at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2010); Reid v. Timeless Rests., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-2481-L, 2010 WL 
4627873, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2010). 
 26 See, e.g., Dixon v. Ladish Co., No. 10-CV-1076, 2011 WL 719018, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 
22, 2011); Leone v. King Pharms., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-230, 2010 WL 4736271, at *2-4 (E.D. Tenn. 
Nov. 16, 2010). 
 27 See, e.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 08-cv-1460 (RCL), 2010 WL 4166773, at 
*2 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2010); Base Metal Trading S.A. v. Russian Aluminum, No. 00 CIV. 9627 JGK 
FM, 2002 WL 987257, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002). 
 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 29 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 671-72, 689-90. 
 30 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Bringing 
Transparency to the Swaps Markets ¶ 9, Remarks at the National Association of Corporate 
Treasurers Conference (June 2, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-83.html) (recounting how swaps 
contributed to 2008 financial crisis). 
 31 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE & FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 17, 26 (2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2010summary.pdf; see also Dunn v. 
4
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valued at $40 trillion for the commodity futures and option markets—are 
about to grow.  The CFTC will regulate the swaps market, over-the-
counter derivatives valued at $300 trillion, another market accused of 
causing the current economic crisis.32  Thus, by virtue of the amount of 
money associated with swaps and commodity futures and option 
markets, the CFTC will become a prominent player in the government’s 
efforts to rebound from financial collapses, the effects of which are still 
being felt today.33 
How the CFTC regulates these markets impacts varying segments 
of society, yielding nationwide consequences.34  Regulation is explicated 
by the statute the CFTC enforces: The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).  
The CEA gives tremendous investigatory and enforcement authority to 
the CFTC.35  Statutory authority recognizes that those who have broken 
the law, who have betrayed investors’ trust, or who have misled market 
participants, should be held accountable for their actions.36  Sometimes 
accountability must be rapid in order to stave off asset depletion or 
document destruction.  These outcomes can be avoided through the 
CFTC’s investigatory and enforcement tools.37  The Commission’s 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1997) (citing Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 356 (1982)). 
 32 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET & PERFORMANCE PLAN: 
FISCAL YEAR 2012, 2-3 (2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcbudget2012.pdf; see also Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 721(a)(21), 124 
Stat. 1376, 1666–69 (H.R. 4173, amending 7 U.S.C. § 1a to include definition of “swap” at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1a(47)). 
 33 Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Not Over Until It’s in The Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, at 
BU1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/business/29gret.html?ref=todayspaper (discussing 
CFTC’s involvement with implementing the Dodd-Frank Act and overseeing the derivatives 
market). 
 34 Id.  As this Article observes, commodity futures and option markets—as well as swaps—
were some of the forces that caused this country’s recent economic decline. And these markets’ 
collective approximate value is nearly $400 trillion.  The agency in charge of regulating these 
markets will take action—whether it be by authoring and implementing administrative rules or by 
bringing CEA enforcement actions—that will generate nationwide consequences.  After all, the 
economic forces at work within the CFTC-expedited discovery context are part and parcel of, if not 
intertwined with, the socio-economic factors that undermined our Nation’s financial stability.  This 
part of the Introduction connects the CFTC, and this Article, to our day’s most pressing concern: the 
economy. 
 35 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-27f (Westlaw 2012). 
 36 In 2009, the CFTC “[o]btained $183 million in restitution and disgorgement and $97 
million in civil monetary penalties in previously filed or existing cases.” COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 20 (2009), 
available at http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2009par.pdf. 
 37 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-1 (Westlaw 2012) (statutory restraining orders); see also 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC ANNUAL REPORT 1997, available at 
www.cftc.gov/anr/anrenf97.htm (describing “quick strike” cases). 
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statutory power is subject to review and scrutiny by federal courts.38  As 
a result, it falls upon courts to ensure the CFTC, a powerful independent 
agency,39 enforces the CEA in a manner that is mindful of procedural 
regularity,40 which demands a resolute fidelity to 26(d)(1)’s strictures.41 
Regrettably, federal courts have forsaken 26(d)(1).  For example, 
courts treat the CFTC differently from private litigants; judges do so by 
signing off on sweeping expedited discovery requests that would be 
viewed skeptically in any other legal arena.42  Courts would perceive 
such requests from other litigants as indicative of abusive discovery.43  
 38 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(C)(v)(VI) (Westlaw 2012) (judicial review of 
Commission’s alteration or supplementation of a contract market rule); id. § 7(b) (referencing 
judicial review of suspension or revocation of a registered entity, as provided for in 7 U.S.C. § 8(b)); 
id. § 8(b) (judicial review of suspension or revocation of a registered entity); id. § 12c(c) (judicial 
review of CFTC’s or exchange’s discipline of an exchange’s member); id. § 27d(c)(6) (judicial 
review of CFTC’s determination or rulemaking that implicates the “predominance test”). 
 39 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (“There is hereby established, as an 
independent agency of the United States Government, a Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission.”). 
 40 Procedural regularity is a broad concept, achieved and maintained through rule fidelity. 
See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 
the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been [a] large factor.”). 
 41 See generally id. 
 42 See MRP, Inc. v. Moreman, No. 3:10-CV-707, 2011 WL 61177, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 
2011) (“The information MRP seeks through expedited discovery in this case is exceedingly 
broad.”); Avaya, Inc. v. Acumen Telecom Corp., No. 10-cv-03075-CMA-BNB, 2011 WL 9293, at 
*2 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2011) (“In this case, the requested discovery is not limited or narrowly tailored, 
but is sweeping in its scope.”); 5ifth Element Creative, LLC v. Kirsch, No. 5:10-cv-255-KKC, 2010 
WL 4102907, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2010) (finding discovery requests overly broad and not 
narrowly tailored to obtain information relevant to preliminary injunction motion’s determination); 
Wheeler v. HXI, LLC, No. 10-cv-145-JD, 2010 WL 3023518, at *2 (D.N.H. July 28, 2010) (“[t]he 
request is not narrowly tailored or sufficiently specific, and risks converting the expedited discovery 
process into a fishing expedition.”); Landwehr v. F.D.I.C., No. 09-0716 (RMU), 2010 WL 2572077, 
at *2 (D.D.C. June 28, 2010) (“Moreover, there is no indication that this expedited discovery would 
be narrowly tailored, as it was in the cases relied on by the plaintiffs.”); L’Occitane, Inc. v. Trans 
Source Logistics, Inc., No. WMN-09-CV-2499, 2009 WL 3746690, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2009) 
(“Moreover, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s request to depose Defendant Cates to be narrowly 
tailored as it does not set forth the subjects upon which it would depose Mr. Cates.”); Sunflower 
Elec. Power Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 08-2575-EFM-DWB, 2009 WL 774340, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 
2009) (“The title of the present renewed motion refers to ‘limited, expedited discovery’, but there is 
no claim that the proposed deposition of the Governor will be limited in scope or duration in any 
manner. The court can only conclude that Sunflower is, in reality, attempting to pursue very broad 
discovery from the Governor concerning all aspects of the present case.”). 
 43 Court decisions frequently authorize a generalized form of “discovery,” oftentimes in 
conjunction with depositions, without mentioning whether the Commission described its proposed 
discovery requests.  See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Groover, No. 4:11-CV-64, 
2011 WL 1490901, at *2, *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Bame, No. CV08–05593, 2008 WL 4377126, at *1, *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. A.S. Templeton Grp., Inc., No. Civ. 03–4999, 2003 WL 
23190194, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2003).  In other legal contexts, courts deny expedited discovery 
because the movant did not detail its proposed discovery requests.  See Boathouse Grp., Inc. v. 
6
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No such perception clings to CFTC discovery requests.  And yet, the rule 
does not differentiate between private and governmental parties.44  It is 
neutral, enunciating a general prohibition against pre-26(f) discovery that 
controls all parties: “A party may not seek discovery from any source 
before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f) . . . .”45  
Courts’ divergent treatment of the CFTC is incompatible with 26(d)(1)’s 
structure and text.  Then again, the rule has little to do with whether a 
court will permit the CFTC to conduct accelerated discovery.46 
Indeed, over a decade’s worth of judicial rubber-stamping has 
reduced 26(d)(1) to near-irrelevancy, a compilation of numbers and 
letters that is—when acknowledged at all—referenced in the most 
general of terms,47 reduced to a barely noticeable citation,48 or paid 
cursory lip service.49  Courts have treated 26(d)(1) as though it is 
incapable of adding anything to a mechanical outcome anathema to the 
robust discretion50 that animates 26(d)(1).51  It is a discretion, however, 
Tigerlogic Corp., No. 10–12125–NMG, 2011 WL 841258, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 7, 2011); Kabyesiza 
v. Rodriguez, No. 10-cv-00216-MSK-KLM, 2010 WL 3923093, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2010); IRC, 
LP v. McLean, No. 09-189-JPG-CJP, 2009 WL 839043, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009). 
 44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source before the 
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f) . . . .”).  “A party” encompasses governmental and 
private litigants, both of which—as 26(d)(1) commands—“[m]ay not seek discovery . . . before the 
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).”  Id.; see also Webb v. CBS Broad., Inc., No. 08 C 
6241, 2011 WL 111615, at *8 n.9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2011) (“A party may not seek discovery before 
the parties’ meeting pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f).”). 
 45 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 46 See infra Appendix IV (decisions granting CFTC expedited discovery without citing FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1)); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Global Fin. Consulting, 
Inc., No. 1:02-CV-2394, 2002 WL 31357171, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2002) (not referencing FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1)); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Bristol Grp., Inc., No. 02-61160, 
2002 WL 31357411, at *1, *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2002) (allowing early discovery without 
mentioning FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1)). 
 47 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kis, No. CIVA 3:06-0935, 2006 
WL 3707872, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. filed Sept. 27, 2006) (“The prohibition upon discovery before the 
early meeting of counsel is removed pursuant to FRCP 26(d).”). 
 48 See, e.g., Groover, 2011 WL 1490901, at *5 (“The Commission may conduct expedited 
discovery, removing the prohibition upon discovery before the early meeting of counsel pursuant to 
FRCP 26(f), in accordance with FRCP 26(d) . . . .”). 
 49 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. M25 Inv., No. 3–09–cv–1831–M, 
2009 WL 3740627, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009) (“The Commission may conduct expedited 
discovery in advance of discovery allowed by FRCP Rule 26.”). 
 50 As a general matter, United States district courts have considerable (or “robust”) discretion 
over discovery.  Because 26(d)(1) concerns discovery—and neither its structure nor text denotes 
when a court should “authorize” pre-26(f) discovery—that rule imports courts’ traditional “robust” 
discretion.  The second paragraph of this Article’s Introduction, along with its supporting citations, 
elucidates this general discovery principle and particular features of 26(d)(1). 
 51 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nations Inv., LLC, No. 07-CV-61058-RWS, at 5 
(N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfnationsorder0
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that courts must exercise in keeping with 26(d)(1)’s structure and text.52  
Otherwise, judicial decisions—the embodiment of such discretion—will 
continue to develop the doctrine illegitimately.  Legitimacy can be 
attained if courts use a framework that connects discretion with 26(d)(1).  
The Author, in a previous Article (Rescuing Expedited Discovery I)53 
introduced such a framework: the “historical blueprint.” 
The historical blueprint is based on a series of cases that construed 
and applied 26(d)(1)’s predecessor, 26(a).54  These decisions were issued 
from 1939 through 1948, what Rescuing Expedited Discovery I labeled 
the ‘transformative era.’55  The transformative era taught “[a]n overall 
lesson: The doctrine’s development must be tethered to the procedural 
rule authorizing early discovery.”56  In other words, the doctrine’s 
history was characterized by ‘rule-based development,’ which 
“[m]andates that interpretations of a procedural rule cannot exceed a 
rule’s structural and textual limitations.”57  It is rule-based development 
that the modern era—decisions from 2000 to 2011 that evaluated CFTC 
expedited discovery requests—lacks, but needs, to attain legitimacy.  
And it is rule-based development that the historical blueprint perpetuates, 
by invoking the doctrine’s history in ways that adhere to 26(d)(1)’s 
structure and text.  By using the historical blueprint, and by revitalizing 
rule-based development, courts will exercise discretion commensurate 
with 26(d)(1)’s structure and text. In so doing, courts will legitimize 
CFTC expedited disco
73007.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Sonoma Trading Corp., No. 05-60342, 2005 
WL 3742849, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2005); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smithers, No. 
05-CV-80592-DTKH, at 4 (S.D. Fla. filed June 30, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfsmithersorder.pdf. 
 52 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 657, 696. 
 53 Id. at 690–96. 
 54 See, e.g., United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1, 5 (W.D. La. 
1948); Munson Line, Inc. v. Green (Munson Line II), 6 F.R.D. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Savage v. 
Isthmian S. S. Co., 6 F.R.D. 311, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Munson Line, Inc. v. Green (Munson Line I), 
6 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Dreskin v. Zinkin, 6 F.R.D. 615, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 
Commander-Larabee Milling Co. v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 7 F.R.D. 168, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1945); 
Int’l Tag & Salesbook Co. v. Am. Salesbook Co., 6 F.R.D. 45, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Price v. 
Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., 3 F.R.D. 350, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Sund v. Club Beachcombers, 
Inc., 2 F.R.D. 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Price v. Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., 3 F.R.D. 350, 350 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943); Walker v. Walker, 1 F.R.D. 779, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Rejsenhoff v. Colonial 
Navigation Co., 1 F.R.D. 395, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Seman v. Leibovitz, 1 F.R.D. 280, 281 (E.D. 
Pa. 1940); Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 35 F. Supp. 633, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); 
Pirnie v. Andrews, 1 F.R.D. 252, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Sweeney v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 
29 F. Supp. 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Alemite Co., 4 F.R.D. 273, 274 
(D.N.D. 1939). 
 55 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 676-77. 
 56 Id. at 676. 
 57 Id. at 677. 
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Consequently, this Article’s purpose is to legitimize CFTC 
expedited discovery.  This Article pursues this purpose by showing 
courts how to apply the historical blueprint to CFTC expedited discovery 
requests.  By applying the historical blueprint, courts will be embracing 
rule-based development, where determinations about allowing or 
denying early discovery turn on 26(d)(1)’s structure and text, a marked 
change from the modern era’s rejection of 26(d)(1).  Rule-based 
development will—by focusing on 26(d)(1)—legitimize CFTC expedited 
discovery. 
In Part I, this Article describes the CFTC expedited discovery 
context.  Then, Part II presents courts’ illegitimate development of CFTC 
expedited discovery.  Part III follows by showing how to legitimize the 
doctrine through the historical blueprint.  Part IV concludes this Article 
by explaining the imperative for legitimacy: why courts should return 
CFTC expedited discovery to 26(d)(1). 
On the one hand, the CFTC expedited discovery context exemplifies 
how courts have strayed from the doctrine’s legal provenance.  On the 
other hand, the context provides courts with a practical and concrete 
opportunity to use the past to improve the present, to validate a dynamic 
procedural device sufficiently flexible to meet the changing and 
unforeseen events comprising CFTC expedited discovery.  And so, the 
process initiated by Rescuing Expedited Discovery I is taken a step 
further by showing courts how to apply the historical blueprint to a 
critical area of law, the primary objective of which is nothing less than 
stabilizing a reeling economy and bringing to justice those who hastened 
its fall. 
I. RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS, RESTRAINING ORDERS & GOOD 
CAUSE: THE CFTC EXPEDITED DISCOVERY CONTEXT 
Understanding the CFTC expedited discovery context is vital to 
assessing the doctrine’s legitimacy.  That context’s underlying theme is 
the Commission’s need for information, prompted by the transactions 
and markets that the CFTC polices.58  Information’s centrality transcends 
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) recordkeeping requirements, ex 
parte restraining orders, and the Good-Cause Test—the context’s core 
components. 
This Part recounts the CFTC expedited discovery context, 
beginning with a brief description of the CEA and the CFTC.  
 58 Scott D. O’Malia, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Ends and 
Means ¶¶ 2-3, Opening Statement at Public Hearing on Consideration of Final Rules (Aug. 4, 2011) 
(transcript available at http://cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement080411.html). 
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Recordkeeping requirements are then considered, followed by restraining 
orders, and ending with Good Cause. 
A. THE NEED FOR INFORMATION: A SUMMARY OF THE CEA & CFTC 
The CFTC is an independent agency, charged with enforcing the 
CEA and regulating the commodity and futures markets.59  Congress 
created the CFTC in 1974, though the commodity and futures markets 
had been regulated since the 1920s.60  The term “commodity” 
encompasses a variety of items ranging from corn to frozen concentrated 
orange juice.61  The CEA governs certain transactions, contracts, and 
participants and the diverse roles each plays in volatile trillion-dollar 
markets.62  Regulation—coupled with advancing the CEA’s stated goals 
of preventing price manipulations, ensuring transactions’ financial 
integrity, and guarding against fraud—hinges on obtaining a wide array 
of information.63  Data is compiled through recordkeeping, registration 
requirements, as well as CFTC inspections and investigations.64 
 59 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(3) (Westlaw 2012) (defining “Commission”); id. § 2(a)(2)(A) 
(creation of Commission). 
 60 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-2015, at 5, 7 
(2011), available at http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2015 
strategicplan.pdf. 
 61 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(4) (Westlaw 2012). 
 62 Transactions occur in interstate and international commerce, contracts are for the sale of a 
commodity for future delivery, and participants are commodity pool operators, commodity trading 
advisors, floor brokers, floor traders, futures commission merchants, and introducing brokers.  See 7 
U.S.C.A. § 5 (Westlaw 2012) (transactions); id. § 1a(6)(A)(i)(I) (commodity trading advisor 
definition referencing contracts for sale of commodity for future delivery); id. § 1a(5) (commodity 
pool operator); id. § 1a(6) (commodity trading advisor); id. § 1a(16) (floor broker); id. § 1a(17) 
(floor trader); id. § 1a(20) (futures commission merchant); id. § 1a(23) (introducing broker). 
 63 7 U.S.C.A. § 5 (Westlaw 2012). 
 64 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(D)(iv) (Westlaw 2012) (periodic or special examinations of 
participants’ records pertaining to security futures); id. § 2(h)(5) (inspection of electronic trading 
facility); id. § 2(h)(7)(C) (price discovery information for electronic trading facilities); id. § 6(a)(3) 
(inspection of contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility manager’s written record 
of contract); id. § 6g (reporting and recordkeeping requirements for floor brokers, futures 
commission merchants, and floor traders); id. § 6i (reporting, recordkeeping, and inspections of 
reports of deals equal to or in excess of trading limits); id. § 6s(f) (reporting and recordkeeping for 
registered swap dealers and major swap participants); id. § 6s(g) (maintenance of swaps daily 
trading records by registered swap dealers and major swap participants); id. § 6t(b) (inspection of 
large swap dealer’s books and records); id. §7(d)(17) (board of trade recordkeeping); id. 7a(d)(6) 
(board of trade daily publication of trading information); id. § 7b-3(f)(10)(A)(iii) (inspection and 
examination of swap execution facility); id. § 12 (information subject to public disclosure); id. § 12a 
(commodity dealers’ and associated persons’ registration); id. § 20 (market reports); id. § 21(a)-(b) 
(futures associations’ registration); id. § 24a(a)(2) (inspection and examination of swap data 
repositories). 
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B. RECORDKEEPING, REGISTRATION, INSPECTION & INVESTIGATION: 
HOW THE CFTC OBTAINS INFORMATION 
Under the CEA, market participants and other entities (such as 
electronic trading facilities and boards of trade) must maintain detailed 
records that the CFTC can inspect upon demand.65  For example, floor 
brokers, futures commission merchants, and floor traders have to 
memorialize transactions, daily trades, and contracts.66  Some 
participants must also register67 with the CFTC, a process that 
necessitates divulging considerable data68 about their business, location 
of business records, branch offices, criminal disclosures, disciplinary 
information, financial disclosures, and contact information.69 
On top of recordkeeping, inspection, and registration, the CFTC 
accumulates information by initiating investigations—including 
undercover operations with the Department of Justice70—that can utilize 
subpoenas, require document production, and compel witnesses’ 
attendance.71  An investigation’s scope is whatever the CFTC deems 
relevant or material.72  If an investigation uncovers statutory violations, 
then the CFTC may pursue enforcement administratively or through the 
federal court system. 
 65 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(h)(5)(B)(i)(II)(ii) (Westlaw 2012) (electronic trading facility); id. § 
7(d)(17) (boards of trade). 
 66 7 U.S.C.A. § 6g (Westlaw 2012). 
 67 The CEA dictates registration requirements, identifying the participants obligated to 
register.  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 6d(a) (Westlaw 2012) (unlawful to act as futures commission 
merchant or introducing broker without registration); id. § 6e (illegal to act as floor trader or as floor 
broker absent registration); id. § 6k (registration with the Commission is required to be associated 
with a futures commission merchant or with an introducing broker as a partner, officer, or 
employee); id. § 6s(a)(1) (unlawful to act as swap dealer unless registered with Commission); id. § 
7a-1 (derivatives clearing organizations registration requirements); id. § 7b-3 (swap execution 
facility registration requirements); id. § 9 (CFTC’s ability to exclude person from privilege of being 
a registered entity); id. § 12a (CFTC’s authority to register futures commission merchants, 
introducing brokers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, floor brokers, and floor 
traders); id. § 21 (registered futures associations’ registration with Commission); id. § 24a(a)(1)(A) 
(unlawful to use mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce to function as swap data repository 
absent registration). 
 68 7 U.S.C.A. § 6n (Westlaw 2012) (registration for commodity trading advisors and 
commodity pool operators). 
 69 See 17 C.F.R. §3.10(a)(1)(i) (Westlaw 2011) (futures commission merchants register 
through Form 7-R furnished by National Futures Association).  Form 7-R is available at 
www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-registration/templates-and-forms/Form7-R-entire.pdf. 
 70 7 U.S.C.A. § 12(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012). 
 71 Id. § 15 (Westlaw 2012). 
 72 Id. 
11
Panoff,: Legitimizing CFTC Expedited Discovery
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
404 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
C. EX PARTE STATUTORY RESTRAINING ORDERS: ENFORCING THE 
CEA 
Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1, the CFTC can bring civil actions in 
federal court for violations of the CEA.73  Complaints are filed under 
seal, oftentimes accompanied by ex parte motions for statutory 
restraining orders.74  Proposed orders, written by the CFTC, are attached 
to the motions.75  These orders are usually signed by judges with 
minimal alterations, especially so with regard to expedited discovery 
determinations.76  Indeed, the CFTC typically seeks early discovery in a 
motion for a restraining order.77  Regardless of whether discovery is 
authorized, restraining orders target a defendant’s “documents” and 
“property,” casting an information-gathering net over a defendant’s 
life.78 
Under 13a-1, restraining orders are comprehensive, providing the 
following relief: 
 
 Prohibiting a defendant from destroying books, records, and 
documents;79 
 73 Id. § 13a-1(a). 
 74 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Satterfield, No. 2:10-CV-02893-
RMG, at 7 (D.S.C. filed Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfgrahamorder1
10910.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Midwest Land & 
Livestock, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-02490-EFM-KGG, at 2, 8 (D. Kan. filed Sept. 13, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfvanderploego
rder09132010.pdf (filed under seal). 
 75 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Foreign Currency, Inc., No. 00-1488, 
2003 WL 22410201, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2003) (“proposed” ex parte statutory restraining 
order allowing expedited discovery). 
 76 Compare U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Queen Shoals, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-
335-RJC, at 4, 10-11 (W.D.N.C. filed Aug. 7, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfqueenshoalssr
o08072009.pdf(no alterations), with Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Chilcott, No. 2:02-CV-
94-FTM-29DNF, 2002 WL 1455345, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. filed Mar. 7, 2002), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/02orders/enfchilcott-sro.pdf (denying expedited discovery). 
 77 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Pippin, No. CV 05-4120, 2005 WL 
3741535, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. G7 
Advisory Serv. LLC, No. Civ. 05-CV-80313, 2005 WL 3710161, at *1, *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2005).  
Motions for statutory restraining orders are significant because they are the filing that the CFTC uses 
(almost exclusively) to request expedited discovery.  The information obtained through a restraining 
order is, in most cases, nearly identical to the information sought through expedited discovery. 
 78 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-1(a) (Westlaw 2012); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Driver, No. SA 09-cv-0578 ODW (RZx), 2009 WL 3396172, at *2-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
17, 2009). 
 79 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Klatch, No. 1:11-cv-05191-GBD, at 6 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 3, 2011), available at 
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 Giving the CFTC access to inspect a defendant’s books, 
records, and documents;80 
 Freezing a defendant’s assets;81 
 Compelling a defendant to identify and preserve its assets;82 
 Mandating financial institutions to deny a defendant access 
to accounts and safe deposit boxes;83 and 
 Forcing additional non-parties, sometimes even attorneys, 
to divulge any information that may be germane to a 
defendant’s alleged violation.84 
Assets are frozen, documents must be preserved, and the Commission 
can sift through a near-limitless array of personal data.85  This relief is 
commensurate with 13a-1’s text, its focus on “documents” and 
“property”; the statute contemplates and allows asset freezes, access to 
records, and document preservation. 
The statute’s invocation depends on whether it appears to the CFTC 
that a person has, is, or is about to engage in any act deviating from the 
CEA.86  If the CFTC finds such a deviation, then it can request an order 
by the court allowing the CFTC to inspect an individual’s bank records, 
cell phone, tax returns, computers, tape recordings, books, records, 
documents, computer discs, balance sheets, income statements, 
accounting records, and personal correspondences87 “[w]herever they 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfklatchorder08
0311.pdf. 
 80 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. El Rhazi, No. 11-cv-02576-DLC, at 6-7 
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 29, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfelrhaziorder0
72911.pdf. 
 81 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. U.S. Ventures LC, No. 2:11-CV-00099-BSJ, 
at 4 (D. Utah filed Jan. 25, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfwinsomeorde
r012511.pdf (sealed). 
 82 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Funding Ass’n, No. CV031826PHXPGR, 
2003 WL 22469911, at *2-3 (D. Alaska Sept. 18, 2003). 
 83 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Tech Inst., No. 11-CV-02163-GHK-
PLA, at 7-9 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 15, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enftradetechorde
r031511.pdf. 
 84 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Groover, No. 4:11-CV-64, 2011 WL 
1490901, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. E-Metal 
Merch., Inc., 2005 WL 3741509, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2005). 
 85 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-1(a) (Westlaw 2012).  The line between “personal” and “business” data 
is faint.  This exposure of “personal data” occurs when, or more precisely after, a court issues a 
statutory restraining order. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Groover, 2011 WL 1490901, at *4; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Gresham, No. 3:09-CV-508-JC, at *11-12 (N.D. Ga. filed July 2, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfgreshamorder
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may be situated and whether they are in the possession of any of the 
Defendants or others.”88  Importantly, courts’ main reason for issuing 
restraining orders is to preclude defendants from dissipating assets and 
destroying documents.89  Without a restraining order, “[i]mmediate and 
irreparable damage to the Court’s ability to grant effective final relief for 
the customers in the form of monetary redress will occur.”90  Hence, 
restraining orders, pursuant to 13a-1, give the Commission 
comprehensive access to a defendant’s information.  This access is 
enhanced by the CFTC Good-Cause Test, which grants expedited 
discovery mechanically.91 
D. THE GOOD-CAUSE TEST: TALISMANIC ADJUDICATION INSTEAD OF 
THOUGHTFUL DELIBERATION 
The Good-Cause Test has emerged, since 2008, as the dominant 
interpretive test courts use to evaluate expedited discovery’s 
permissibility.92  The test is neither nuanced nor detailed, stating that 
“[g]ood cause exists for the Commission to conduct expedited 
discovery . . . .”93  This is a conclusory pronouncement, devoid of insight 
or thoughtfulness, allowing expedited discovery because Good Cause94 
exists.  By relying on Good Cause, courts have embraced talismanic 
adjudication, where outcomes turn on whether a catchphrase—“Good 
Cause”—is recited.  Under talismanic adjudication, “[c]atchphrases 
07022009.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Lexington Royce & Assocs., No. 04 CV 
02768, 2004 WL 856460, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004). 
 88 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kim, No. 11 CIV 1013, 2011 WL 554105, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011). 
 89 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smith, No. 1:10CV00009, 2010 WL 
1759542, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2010); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Milton, No. 10-
CV-80738-KAM, at 2 (S.D. Fla. filed June 22, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enftradeorder062
22010.pdf. 
 90 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yellowstone Partners, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-
85-FL, 2010 WL 1780005, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2010). 
 91 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. ACJ Capital, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01419-JAF, 
at 3 (D.P.R. filed May 4, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfacjcapitalorde
r050411.pdf (filed under seal). 
 92 See infra Appendix II. 
 93 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. PMC Strategy, LLC, No. 3:11CV73, 2011 
WL 564293, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 94 This Article capitalizes Good Cause when discussing the Good-Cause Test.  When 
addressing “good cause” in the abstract or as a judicial determination’s basis, this Article does not 
capitalize the phrase. 
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replace thought, providing little guidance for future use.”95  This 
approach forsakes thoughtful deliberation, where decisions and their 
interpretive tests are explained.96 
E. SUMMARY: AN INFORMATION-DRIVEN CONTEXT 
The CFTC expedited discovery context reflects the Commission’s 
need for information.  The Commission uses data to regulate volatile 
markets and to enforce the CEA, which equips the Commission with 
information-gathering tools such as mandatory recordkeeping and 
registration requirements, as well as the ability to conduct inspections 
and investigations.  When violations are detected, the CFTC can bring an 
action administratively97 or in federal court.  If the judicial process is 
utilized, then so too are ex parte requests for restraining orders, which if 
granted give the CFTC almost carte blanche access to a defendant’s data.  
Motions for restraining orders are also granted when the CFTC seeks 
expedited discovery, requests that courts have, since 2008, evaluated 
almost exclusively by relying on the Good-Cause Test.  As Part II 
elaborates, the Good-Cause Test is but one of several factors contributing 
to CFTC expedited discovery’s illegitimacy. 
II. IGNORING FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1): COURTS’ ILLEGITIMATE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CFTC EXPEDITED DISCOVERY 
According to 26(d)(1), “[a] party may not seek discovery from any 
source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), 
except . . . when authorized by . . . court order.”98  The judicial inquiry, 
therefore, is determining when to authorize pre-26(f) discovery.  This is a 
challenging enterprise because while 26(d)(1) permits early discovery, 
the rule is silent about its propriety, leaving courts “[e]ffectively on their 
own in determining whether to grant or deny accelerated relief.”99  The 
decision is one of discretion; how courts wield this considerable 
 95 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 674 (citing and quoting Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 455 (1899) (“It is not the first 
use but the tiresome repetition of inadequate catch words upon which I am observing,—phrases 
which originally were contributions, but which, by their very felicity, delay further analysis for fifty 
years.”)). 
 96 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 674-75. 
 97 Enforcement actions are brought before and decided by the Commission.  7 U.S.C.A. § 9 
(Westlaw 2012); id. § 13a. 
 98 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 99 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 652. 
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discretion will, in many ways, dictate expedited discovery’s 
legitimacy.100 
If courts harmonize discretion with 26(d)(1)’s structure and text, 
then the doctrine will become legitimate.101  In general, courts exercise 
their discretion by developing interpretive tests for procedural rules.  
Interpretive tests help courts understand and apply a rule.  However, and 
as it relates to expedited discovery, “[g]lossing over 26(d)(1) creates the 
impression that the rule has little, if anything, to do with expedited 
discovery’s permissibility.  This impression calls into question the 
validity of the doctrine’s development; to elevate court-created tests over 
a procedural rule is to embrace a robust form of discretion that no rule, 
including 26(d)(1), authorizes.”102  Interpretive tests that treat expedited 
discovery as a stand-alone doctrine, detached from 26(d)(1), forget that 
“[a] court’s ability to authorize expedited discovery emanates from an 
identifiable source, in this instance a specific procedural rule.  Judges 
should not be making the doctrine up as they go but should be utilizing a 
provenance to respond to participants’ needs.”103  At bottom, courts have 
lost track of the juridical task at hand: interpreting and applying 
26(d)(1).104  CFTC expedited discovery’s illegitimacy has much to do 
with courts failing to abide by one of law’s integral interpretive 
precepts—courts should construe procedural rules according to their 
plain meanings.105  Over a decade’s worth of judicial decisions and the 
interpretive tests they utilize have driven a divide between 26(d)(1) and 
CFTC expedited discovery. 
This Part studies courts’ illegitimate development of CFTC 
expedited discovery.  It does so by first summarizing 26(d)(1)’s structure 
and text.  Next, courts’ interpretive tests are charted, examined alongside 
26(d)(1)’s details.  This Part closes with judicial decisions’ recurring 
features, what this Article terms “Boilerplate Justice.” 
 100 Id. at 652, 657. 
 101 Id. at 696 (“As such, the doctrine’s development—perpetuated by judicial discretion—
must comport with the structure and text of 26(d)(1), and if it does, then it will become legitimate.”). 
 102 Id. at 673-74 (citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Mow Trading Corp., 749 F. 
Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“This Court has set forth the requirements for expedited 
discovery . . . .”)). 
 103 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 687-88. 
 104 Id. at 673. 
 105 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991); 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (“We give the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure their plain meaning . . . .”). 
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A. EXPEDITED DISCOVERY’S SOURCE: 26(d)(1)’S STRUCTURE & TEXT 
Though 26(d)(1) lacks a comprehensive list of mandatory elements, 
it does have details that should guide and confine discretion, nuances 
comprising 26(d)(1)’s structure and text. 
1. Structure 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1)’s structure has two parts: 
(i) a general prohibition against pre-26(f) discovery, and (ii) a 
discretionary exception to that prohibition.106  The general prohibition 
states “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the 
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).”107  As for the 
discretionary exception, 26(d)(1) provides that the general prohibition 
applies “except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under 
Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by 
court order.”108  Expedited discovery is the fourth exception. 
The doctrine’s structural status as an exception imports traditional 
interpretive precepts109 that maintain distinctions between rules and their 
corresponding exceptions.110  These precepts are “[c]ourts construe 
exceptions narrowly to prevent them from subsuming their 
corresponding rules. Overly expansive interpretations undermine the 
interpretive process.  Similarly, courts refrain from creating exceptions to 
procedural rules, believing that doing so will impede rather than advance 
justice.”111  When courts determine whether to “authorize”112 CFTC 
expedited discovery, they should recall and apply these precepts.  Such a 
 106 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 657-59. 
 107 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 108 Id. 
 109 These traditional precepts should confine interpretations of 26(d)(1).  They should inform 
a court’s understanding of expedited discovery’s structural significance, which will, in turn, help 
determine early discovery’s appropriateness. 
 110 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 658-59.  Traditional interpretive precepts 
include: (i) courts construe exceptions narrowly to prevent them from subsuming their corresponding 
rules, Ross v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 625 F.3d 808, 816 (4th Cir. 2010); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. 
BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 2001); (ii) unduly expansive constructions 
undermine the interpretive process, A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945); Mused 
v. U.S.D.A., 169 F.R.D. 28, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); and (iii) courts avoid creating exceptions to 
procedural rules, contending that doing so will impede rather than advance justice, Alexander v. 
Forest City Pierrepoint Assocs., No. CV 94-3961, 1995 WL 406135, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 
1995); see also Brockner v. McHugh, No. 07-CV-703-JTC, 2010 WL 5072662, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 10, 2010) (quoting Alexander, 1995 WL 406135, at *3). 
 111 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 658-59. 
 112 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
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step would harness discretion and comport with the doctrine’s structural 
status as an exception. 
2. Text 
Turning to the rule’s text, 26(d)(1) involves (i) specific actors, (ii) 
primary and secondary conduct, and (iii) a time period.113  Actors are 
parties, courts, and non-parties: “A party may not seek discovery from 
any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), 
except . . . when authorized . . . by court order.” 114  Primary conduct 
entails seeking discovery from any source: “A party may not seek 
discovery from any source . . . .”115  The rule’s primary conduct calls to 
mind discovery’s foundational purposes of preparing for trial, ensuring 
that both sides have the same evidence, and preventing “trial by 
surprise.”116  Secondary conduct occurs when courts authorize discovery 
“by court order,”117 a discretionary endeavor depending on independent 
juridical analysis: “except . . . when authorized . . . by court order.”118  
Lastly, 26(d)(1)’s timeframe ranges from a complaint’s filing until the 
26(f) conference: “A party may not seek discovery from any source 
before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f) . . . .”119 
All of these characteristics—26(d)(1)’s structure and text—should 
be respected by a court’s interpretive test, the elements judges use to 
construe and apply 26(d)(1).  That 26(d)(1)’s characteristics have been 
discarded instead of embraced evidences illegitimacy.  The result is a 
schism between a doctrine’s development and 26(d)(1)’s structure and 
text. 
B. DISCRETION WITHOUT EXPLANATION: AUTHORIZING DISCOVERY 
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY INTERPRETIVE TEST 
CFTC expedited discovery’s beginnings were inauspicious 
exercises of discretion lacking explanation.  From 2000 through 2007, 
courts usually authorized pre-26(f) discovery without using any express 
interpretive test.120  Though courts would occasionally invoke Good 
 113 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 659–61. 
 114 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 115 Id. (emphasis added). 
 116 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 686 n.195.  “Trial by surprise” is a phrase 
courts have used in explaining one of discovery’s traditional aims. 
 117 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 118 Id. (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. (emphasis added). 
 120 See infra Appendix I. 
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Cause, most merely declared discovery’s permissibility, proclamations 
bereft of analysis. 
1. Discretion Without Explanation 
Authorizing pre-26(f) discovery without using an interpretive test121 
manifested itself in four ways.122  Although slight variations exist, all 
four achieved the same result: granting the CFTC accelerated relief for 
no discernible reason.  Those four methods are as follows: 
 
1. The CFTC is authorized to immediately take the deposition 
of anyone and to demand the production of documents from 
anyone.123 
2. The prohibition against pre-26(f) discovery is removed.124 
3. Expedited discovery is authorized and may commence 
forthwith.125 
4. The CFTC is granted limited immediate discovery.126 
 
 121 Authorizing discovery—without any explanation as to why doing so is proper—can 
neither be described as nor mistaken for “analysis.”  Instead, it is nothing more than a judicial 
decree, a raw exertion of power.  The analysis, if any was conducted at all, must be expressed within 
the confines of a judicial decision.  Discretion without explanation does no such thing.  There is no 
tangible proof that 26(d)(1) influenced a court’s determination to authorize CFTC expedited 
discovery. 
 122 See infra Appendix I. 
 123 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Advent Capital Partners, Ltd., No. 1:02-CV-
1381, 2002 WL 31357169, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 22, 2002); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Luger, No. 02-80435, 2002 WL 1789768, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 3, 2002); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Offshore Fin. Consultants of Fla., Inc., No. Civ.A. 02–
60769, 2002 WL 1788031, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2002); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Bullion & Coin, Inc., No. 00-6885-CV-ZLOCH, at 16-17 (S.D. Fla. filed June 29, 
2000), available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/00orders/enfnbc.pdf. 
 124 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Liberty Mut., No. 1:07-CV-21267-JAL, at 
6-7 (S.D. Fla. filed May 16, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfsupamaorder.
pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. FX First, Inc., No. SACV 03-1454-JVS, 2003 
WL 23195524, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2003) (consent order); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Am. Derivatives Corp., No. 05-CV-7192-RWS, at 8-9 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 26, 2005), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfamericanderivativesorder.pdf. 
 125 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Sonoma Trading Corp., No. 05-60342, 2005 WL 
3742849, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2005); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smithers, No. 05-
CV-80592-DTKH, at 4 (S.D. Fla. filed June 30, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfsmithersorder.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Nations Inv., LLC, No. 07-CV-61058-RWS, at 5 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfnationsorder0
73007.pdf. 
 126 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schotz, No. 04-CV-8889-SJO, at 8-9 (C.D. 
Cal. filed Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enf-schotz-sro.pdf. 
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As can be seen, discretion without explanation “authorize[s]”127 
expedited discovery without articulating why accelerated relief is 
appropriate or how it is consistent with 26(d)(1).  Judges exercise their 
discretion—by permitting early discovery—in a vacuum, devoid of 
illustrating how the circumstances surrounding the CFTC’s request 
coincide with 26(d)(1).  But “[d]iscretion is more than decreeing a 
motion’s fate; it is the reasoned exercise of choice,128 a thoughtful 
consideration and deliberation of law’s interactions with life.”129  The 
CFTC’s reasons for seeking expedited discovery must be scrutinized 
through 26(d)(1).  And this scrutiny should be chronicled, memorialized 
in the judicial decision that grants or denies expedited discovery. 
2. Shortcomings 
Permitting pre-26(f) discovery without invoking an interpretive test 
denigrates 26(d)(1)’s secondary conduct and actors.  Secondary 
conduct—“authorized by court order”—hinges on discretion, the 
reasoned exercise of choice.130  A judge’s choice, within 26(d)(1), is 
finite between authorizing or denying accelerated relief.131  When this 
choice lacks an interpretive test, is attenuated from 26(d)(1), and is 
devoid of discernible reasoning, it amounts to an “unreasoned” exercise 
of choice.132  In short, it resembles arbitrary force.133  Arbitrariness, 
almost as a general proposition, is inherently illegitimate, contrary to the 
judicial function that is central to the rule’s secondary conduct.134 
 127 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 128 See Jesse N. Panoff, Debtors, Creditors, Default Judgments, & Discretion: Why Rule 
62(b)(4) Will Become One of the Most Important Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 227, 240 (2010). 
 129 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 675 (citing Learned Hand, The Speech of 
Justice, 29 HARV. L. REV. 617, 621 (1916) (“[I]n the end they are charged with choosing but of 
choosing well.”)); see also Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 467-68 (1916) 
(articulating the nexus between life and law); Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 3 
COMMW. L. REV. 22, 23 (1905) (“Indeed it is a maxim of the law: Out of the facts grows the law; 
that is, propositions are not considered abstractly, but always with reference to facts.”). 
 130 See Panoff, Debtors, Creditors, Default Judgments, & Discretion: Why Rule 62(b)(4) Will 
Become One of the Most Important Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 240. 
 131 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 651–52. 
 132 Id. at 673-74. 
 133 See generally Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (observing that within FED. R. 
CIV. P. 15 context rendering a decision without offering a justification “is not an exercise of 
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal 
Rules.”); Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1993) (“When the trial judge delegates a 
decision, and gives no reason for the decision, that is not an exercise of discretion but an absence of 
and an abuse of discretion.”). 
 134 See generally United States v. Rhine, 37 F.3d 525, 542 (5th Cir. 2011) (arbitrary judicial 
decisions embody an individual jurist’s preferences or prejudices). 
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Within 26(d)(1), the judicial function, while discretionary, is linked 
to a specific task.  A court, as one of the actors under 26(d)(1), is charged 
with effectuating the rule’s secondary conduct by interpreting and 
applying 26(d)(1).135  When courts “authorize”136 discovery without an 
interpretive test, they appear to be making the doctrine up as they go, 
insinuating that expedited discovery is court-created, to be expanded or 
contracted on a judge’s whim.137  Aggrandizing 26(d)(1)’s judicial 
function clashes with the rule’s prescribed role for courts.  Discretion 
without explanation and its appearance of arbitrary creativity should be 
rejected. 
C. TURNING AN EXCEPTION INTO A RULE, ABANDONING THE 
FEDERAL RULES, & DIFFERENTIATING THE CFTC: THE GOOD-
CAUSE TEST 
Beginning in 2008, the Good-Cause Test has become courts’ 
predominant interpretive test.138  It consists of the following: “Good 
cause exists for the plaintiff [CFTC] to conduct expedited 
discovery . . . .”139  This standard, while at first glance appearing to be an 
improvement over discretion without explanation, is little more than a 
hollow catchphrase, incapable of adding any insight into a court’s 
expedited discovery evaluation. 
1. The Good-Cause Test 
Good Cause is analytically anemic, conditioning early discovery 
upon talismanic adjudication where a phrase’s utterance conjures a legal 
result.140  Through talismanic adjudication “[c]atchphrases replace 
thought, providing little guidance for future use.”141  Under the current 
 135 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 659, 695. 
 136 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 137 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 688. 
 138 See infra Appendix II. 
 139 See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. ACJ Capital, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01419-
JAF, at 3 (D.P.R. filed May 4, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfacjcapitalorde
r050411.pdf (filed under seal). 
 140 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 673. 
 141 Id. at 674 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. 
L. REV. 443, 455 (1899) (“It is not the first use but the tiresome repetition of inadequate catch words 
upon which I am observing,—phrases which originally were contributions, but which, by their very 
felicity, delay further analysis for fifty years.”)). 
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model, if Good Cause exists, then expedited discovery is allowed.142  
The test is whether “[g]ood cause exists for the Commission to conduct 
expedited discovery.”143  To date, however, not a single CFTC decision 
has explained what Good Cause is or where it comes from—it just 
“exists.”144 
2. Shortcomings 
Rescuing Expedited Discovery I cautioned, “[t]he phrase ‘good 
cause’ is not new; it carries connotations adverse to expedited 
discovery’s status as an exception.  By and large, good-cause tests are 
notoriously easy to satisfy, risking converting an exception into the 
rule.”145  And that is exactly what has happened with CFTC expedited 
discovery. 
Rule 26(d)(1)’s classification of expedited discovery as an 
exception—memorialized in the rule’s discretionary exception—146 
means that accelerated relief should be denied more often than it is 
granted, lest the exception overwhelm the rule.147  From 2008 to 2011, 
under the Good-Cause Test, courts have denied the CFTC expedited 
discovery only once.148  Accelerated relief’s nearly guaranteed 
authorization transforms the doctrine’s status as an exception into the 
rule, contrary to 26(d)(1)’s discretionary exception.  The Good-Cause 
Test does not interpret 26(d)(1); it rewrites it.  Such an alteration of 
26(d)(1) reveals another flaw: the tacit failure of judges to follow the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 142 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. People’s Alt., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-
07013-GAF-E, at 3 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 22, 2010) (“Good cause also exists to permit immediate 
expedited discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfpeoplesorder
092210.pdf. 
 143 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. PMC Strategy, LLC, No. 3:11CV73, 2011 
WL 564293, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 144 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Prestige Ventures Corp., No. 5:09-cv-
01284-R, at 3, 16 (W.D. Okla. filed Nov. 20, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfprestigeorder
11202009.pdf (sealed). 
 145 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 670 (citing Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 
624 F.3d 1252, 1259 (9th Cir. 2010); Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 187 
(1st Cir. 2004)). 
 146 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“[e]xcept . . . when authorized by . . . court order.”). 
 147 See, e.g., Ross v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 625 F.3d 808, 816 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 148 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. UForex Consulting, LLC, 551 F. Supp. 2d 513, 
516 (W.D. La. 2008) (denying expedited discovery because it was “premature”). 
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Judges, no less than any other legal participant, must adhere to 
rules’ boundaries.149  This principle is rooted in Fed. R. Civ. P. 1150 and 
in how courts conceptualize the Fed. R. Civ. P. as a statute.151  A 
commitment to following the Fed. R. Civ. P. sends a message to litigants 
about a rule’s binding force.152  Within Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1), 
adherence materializes in the general prohibition that “[a] party may not 
seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as 
required by Rule 26(f).”153  The general prohibition is clear; it forbids 
“seeking discovery” before the 26(f) meeting.154  When courts habitually 
grant expedited discovery requests through the Good-Cause Test, they 
signal the irrelevancy of the prohibition, sapping it of legal force. 
The Good-Cause Test’s last shortcoming—on top of transforming 
an exception into a rule and betraying the general prohibition within 
26(d)(1)—is that it causes courts to treat the CFTC differently from other 
litigants.155  This is so because the Good-Cause Test does not erect any 
meaningful barriers or constraints on discretion.  The CFTC’s success in 
obtaining early discovery—through the Good-Cause Test—speaks to 
courts’ willingness to permit CFTC pre-26(f) discovery.  Tellingly, other 
contexts use so-called good-cause tests.  However, the results are not so 
one-sided; private litigants, unlike the Commission, do not almost always 
obtain accelerated relief.156  The rule’s reference to “parties” does not 
 149 Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 F.R.D. 55, 56 (D.N.D. 1943); Walling 
v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 2 F.R.D. 416, 419 (E.D.S.C. 1942). 
 150 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in 
the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. 
Supp. 513, 521 (D. Md. 1977); Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). 
 151 Green Constr. Co. v. Williams Form Eng’g Corp., 101 F.R.D. 12, 13 (W.D. Mich. 1984); 
United States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163, 164 (D. Mont. 1948); Kuenzel v. Universal Carloading & 
Distrib. Co., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 407, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Barrezueta v. Sword S.S. Line, Inc., 27 F. 
Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 152 Canister v. Leahy, 182 F.2d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 1950) (“The Rules are rules of procedure. 
They must be adhered to.”); Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518, 527 (E.D.S.C. 1948). 
 153 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 154 See, e.g., Webb v. CBS Broad., Inc., No. 08 C 6241, 2011 WL 111615, at *8 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 13, 2011) (“A party may not seek discovery before the parties’ meeting pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(f).”). 
 155 Admittedly, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1, some differentiation exists; the CEA permits the 
CFTC to acquire ex parte relief that private litigants would have a more difficult time obtaining.  
Consider that in the administrative context, preliminary injunctions and restraining orders are 
evaluated by different standards, with lower thresholds for an agency to overcome.  See, e.g., U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 676-77 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (showing of irreparable harm unnecessary). 
 156 See MRP, Inc. v. Moreman, No. 3:10-CV-707, 2011 WL 61177, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 
2011) (“The information MRP seeks through expedited discovery in this case is exceedingly 
broad.”); Avaya, Inc. v. Acumen Telecom Corp., No. 10-cv-03075-CMA-BNB, 2011 WL 9293, at 
*2 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2011) (“In this case, the requested discovery is not limited or narrowly tailored, 
but is sweeping in its scope.”); 5ifth Element Creative, LLC v. Kirsch, Civil Action No. 5:10-cv-
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justify distinguishing the CFTC from private litigants.157  For instance, if 
a private litigant requests “discovery” in the abstract,158 then most courts 
would suspect abusive discovery, where the aim is not to uncover a 
case’s facts, but to gain a tactical advantage over an adversary.159  Yet, 
under Good Cause, “discovery” in the abstract is routinely given to the 
CFTC.  Such a differentiation is unsupported by 26(d)(1)’s treatment of 
“parties.”  Good Cause’s bad consequences do not deserve judicial 
perpetuation. 
D. TRANSITORY OUTLIERS: FOUR ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETIVE TESTS 
TO DEVELOPING CFTC EXPEDITED DISCOVERY 
Courts primarily use either discretion without explanation, or the 
Good-Cause Test to develop CFTC expedited discovery, to determine 
when to allow accelerated relief.160  Since 2000, four alternatives—all 
transitory outliers—have cropped up sporadically and have been used 
only in a handful of cases.161  Though their impact is marginal, these 
alternatives are worth exploring in order to paint a comprehensive picture 
of the doctrine’s illegitimate development. 
255-KKC, 2010 WL 4102907, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2010) (discovery requests overly broad and 
not narrowly tailored to obtain information relevant to preliminary injunction motion’s 
determination); Wheeler v. HXI, LLC, No. 10-cv-145-JD, 2010 WL 3023518, at *2 (D.N.H. July 28, 
2010) (“[T]he request is not narrowly tailored or sufficiently specific, and risks converting the 
expedited discovery process into a fishing expedition.”); Landwehr v. F.D.I.C., No. 09-0716 (RMU),  
2010 WL 2572077, at *2 (D.D.C. June 28, 2010) (“Moreover, there is no indication that this 
expedited discovery would be narrowly tailored, as it was in the cases relied on by the plaintiffs.”); 
L’Occitane, Inc. v. Trans Source Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL 3746690, at *2 (D. Md. 2009) 
(“Moreover, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s request to depose Defendant Cates to be narrowly 
tailored as it does not set forth the subjects upon which it would depose Mr. Cates.”); Sunflower 
Elec. Power Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 08-2575-EFM-DWB, 2009 WL 774340, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 
2009) (“The title of the present renewed motion refers to ‘limited, expedited discovery’, but there is 
no claim that the proposed deposition of the Governor will be limited in scope or duration in any 
manner. The court can only conclude that Sunflower is, in reality, attempting to pursue very broad 
discovery from the Governor concerning all aspects of the present case.”). 
 157 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 663–64. 
 158 “Discovery in the abstract” is when a movant asks a court to authorize “discovery.”  The 
particular type of discovery (e.g., depositions, requests for production, interrogatories, requests for 
admissions, written depositions, physical inspections), scope (subject matter), and timeframe are 
omitted.  A litigant just wants discovery in the abstract. 
 159 One form of abuse, associated with excessive discovery requests, is “extortionate 
discovery.”  See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010), 
judgment vacated, 131 S. Ct. 3060 (2011); FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 614 F.3d 
335, 339 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 160 See infra Appendices I, II. 
 161 See infra Appendix III. 
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1. Transitory Outliers 
The alternative tests have the same general flaws as discretion 
without explanation and Good Cause.  They all omit meaningful analysis 
and gloss over 26(d)(1).162  They are broad conditions precedent to early 
discovery’s propriety.163 
 
1. There is a need to permit expedited discovery to ensure 
the protection of Defendants’ customers’ interests.164 
2. Expedited discovery is proper because of an undisclosed 
“emergency.”165 
3. “This is a proper case for . . . granting expedited 
discovery.”166 
4. Expedited discovery is authorized because an ex parte 
statutory restraining order was proper.167 
2. Shortcomings 
The first alternative conceptualizes discovery robustly, running up 
against the rule’s primary conduct—“seek discovery from any 
source.”168  The rule’s primary conduct evokes discovery’s foundational 
purposes: preparing for trial, ensuring that both sides have the same 
evidence, and eluding trial by surprise.169  The vague desire to “protect 
investors’ interests” falls outside of these core purposes.  It also injects 
another actor into 26(d)(1)’s primary conduct: non-party investors.  
Injecting additional actors into the rule’s primary conduct interpolates 
 162 See id. 
 163 See id. 
 164 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Am. Inv. Serv., Inc., No. 04-CV- —- -
DGP, at 4-5 (S.D. Fla. filed June 10, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enffirstamerican-order.pdf. 
 165 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, No. Civ.A. 03 C 4346, 2003 WL 
22359573, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2003). 
 166 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Bristol Grp., Inc., No. 02-61160, 2002 WL 
31357411, at *1, *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2002); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Premium Income Corp., No. 05-CV-0416-JJ, at 2, 13 (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 2, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enf-premium-income-corp-order.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Orion Int’l, Inc., No. 03-CV-603-GD, at 2, 13 (D. Or. filed May 8, 2003), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/03orders/enforion-sro.pdf. 
 167 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yanev, No. 2:05CV900, 2005 WL 2991180, at 
*3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2005). 
 168 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 169 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 686 n.195. 
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rather than interprets 26(d)(1);170 primary conduct is textually confined 
to parties seeking disc 171
The second alternative prevents meaningful evaluation because the 
term “emergency” is not explicated.172  At a minimum, this omission is 
critical because of 26(d)(1)’s timeframe.  If the “emergency” can be 
addressed after the 26(f) conference, then discovery need not occur 
immediately.  Likewise, if the “emergency” is not discovery-related, then 
26(d)(1) is inapplicable. 
The third alternative diminishes 26(d)(1)’s reference to non-parties, 
encompassed within “any source.”173  Because the general prohibition 
precludes a party from “seek[ing] discovery from any source,” 26(d)(1) 
implicitly acknowledges that non-parties have the ability to resist 
unauthorized discovery requests.174  Resistance is meaningful only if 
non-parties know when it would be worthwhile to do so, something the 
third alternative frustrates by allowing discovery in “proper cases.”175  
Without judicial elaboration on why a given case is “proper,” non-parties 
cannot evaluate when or whether to file motions to quash.176  The result 
is that whenever a court identifies a “proper case” for early discovery, 
non-parties must comply irrespective of whether a court might 
reevaluate177 its previous determination.  This outcome nullifies 
26(d)(1)’s reference to non-parties. 
The fourth and final alternative is mechanical; if a 13a-1 restraining 
order is proper, then expedited discovery is granted.178  To begin with, 
mechanical invocations of expedited discovery weaken if not remove 
26(d)(1) discretion, a choice that should be based on that rule’s contours.  
Under the fourth alternative, a court’s decision hinges on 13a-1, not 
 170 See generally Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (“We have no power to rewrite 
the Rules by judicial interpretations.”). 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source . . . .”); see also 
Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 659. 
 172 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, No. Civ.A. 03 C 4346, 2003 WL 
22359573, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2003). 
 173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source . . . .”). 
 174 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 659-60. 
 175 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Bristol Grp., Inc., No. 02-61160, 2002 WL 
31357411, at *1, *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2002); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Premium Income Corp., No. 05-CV-0416-JJ, at 2, 13 (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 2, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enf-premium-income-corp-order.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Orion Int’l, Inc., No. 03-CV-603-GD, at 2, 13 (D. Or. filed May 8, 2003), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/03orders/enforion-sro.pdf. 
 176 Premium Income Corp., No. 05-CV-0416-JJ, at 2, 13; Orion Int’l, Inc., No. 03-CV-603-
GD, at 2, 13; First Bristol Grp., Inc., 2002 WL 31357411, at *1, *7. 
 177 A reevaluation would have to be prompted by a non-party. 
 178 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yanev, No. 2:05CV900, 2005 WL 2991180, at 
*3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2005). 
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26(d)(1).  Again, courts issue restraining orders when the CFTC satisfies 
13a-1.  Consequently, this last alternative displaces 26(d)(1):179 so long 
as the CFTC can meet 13a-1, accelerated relief will be allowed.  By 
eclipsing 26(d)(1) and by mechanizing a discretionary process, the fourth 
alternative tramples the rule’s secondary conduct. 
E. BOILERPLATE JUSTICE: CFTC DECISIONS’ RECURRING FEATURES 
CFTC decisions are homogeneous, are written by the CFTC, and 
never quote 26(d)(1), recurring features this Article dubs “Boilerplate 
Justice.”  Boilerplate Justice erodes the rule’s secondary conduct, 
trivializes 26(d)(1)’s treatment of actors, and eviscerates the rule’s 
discretionary exception. 
1. Homogeneity 
CFTC decisions possess nearly identical structures and details.180  
Decisions begin with jurisdictional findings, followed by a summary of 
the relief “good cause” permits.181  Then, a definitional section is 
offered, usually covering “documents,” “assets,” “defendants,” and 
“relief defendants.”182  Decisions close by detailing the relief granted.183  
Instead of assessing a 26(d)(1) request independently, courts adopt CFTC 
positions wholesale, departing from the independent juridical evaluation, 
 179 Id. 
 180 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Capitalstreet Fin., LLC, No. 3:09-CV-387-
RJC, at 3, 6-7 (W.D.N.C. filed Sept. 9, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcapitalstreeto
rder09092009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Healy, No. 1:09-CV-1331-CCC, at 
19-20 (M.D. Pa. filed July 13, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfhealyorder07
132009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Capital Blu Mgmt., LLC, No. 6:09-CV-
508-JA, at 3, 16 (M.D. Fla. filed Mar. 23, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcapitalbluord
er03232009.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Palmer, No. 1:09-
CV-00076-EJL, at 2, 14 (D. Idaho filed Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfpalmerorder0
2262009.pdf. 
 181 Capitalstreet Fin., No. 3:09-CV-387-RJC, at 3, 6-7; Healy, No. 1:09-CV-1331-CCC, at 
19-20; Capital Blu Mgmt., No. 6:09-CV-508-JA, at *3, 16 (filed under seal); Palmer, No. 1:09-CV-
00076-EJL, at 2, 14. 
 182 Capitalstreet Fin., No. 3:09-CV-387-RJC, at 3, 6-7; Healy, No. 1:09-CV-1331-CCC, at 
19-20; Capital Blu Mgmt., No. 6:09-CV-508-JA, at *3, 16 (filed under seal); Palmer, No. 1:09-CV-
00076-EJL, at 2, 14. 
 183 Capitalstreet Fin., No. 3:09-CV-387-RJC, at 3, 6-7; Healy, No. 1:09-CV-1331-CCC, at 
19-20; Capital Blu Mgmt., No. 6:09-CV-508-JA, at *3, 16 (filed under seal); Palmer, No. 1:09-CV-
00076-EJL, at 2, 14. 
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which the rule’s secondary conduct demands.  Homogeneity—assembly 
line adjudication that manufactures one-size-fits-all decisions—is not 
accidental; it is the natural outgrowth of CFTC-written decisions in 
which legally binding determinations are drafted and crafted by a litigant 
as opposed to a judge.184  This homogeneity is not legal analysis, it is 
rote parroti
2. CFTC-Written Decisions 
At least since 2000, the CFTC has written the orders allowing itself 
early discovery.185  While attorney-written decisions are legally binding, 
they still raise concerns about legitimacy by blurring the lines that 
separate interested advocates from disinterested adjudicators.186  The 
assumption is that attorneys argue and judges decide; decisions are 
accepted because they are presumably written by a disinterested arm of 
the state, rather than a zealous advocate.187  CFTC-written decisions 
contradict this assumption.188  Moreover, these decisions ignore 
26(d)(1)’s insistence that expedited discovery must be “[a]uthorized 
by . . . court order.”189  The rule links courts with the secondary conduct 
of authorizing discovery.  This connection fixes courts’ obligation to 
determine the appropriateness of early discovery.190  CFTC written 
decisions sever this link, revealing courts’ abdication of their 26(d)(1) 
duty to decide discovery’s propriety. 
3. Never Quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) 
As bad as homogeneity is and as troubling as Commission-written 
decisions are, both are trumped by CFTC decisions’ third common 
feature: never quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).191  This practice removes 
 184 Capitalstreet Fin., No. 3:09-CV-387-RJC, at 3, 6-7; Healy, No. 1:09-CV-1331-CCC, at 
19-20; Capital Blu Mgmt., No. 6:09-CV-508-JA, at *3, 16 (filed under seal); Palmer, No. 1:09-CV-
00076-EJL, at 2, 14. 
 185 See infra Appendices I–III. 
 186 See Jesse N. Panoff, Why State Trial Court Judges Should Write Their Own Decisions: 
Transforming the Current System, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 331(2009). 
 187 Id. at 331-32. 
 188 All of this is further compounded by an “insidiousness [that] exists because the practice of 
attorney-written decisions occurs in the dark; most people, especially litigants, do not know that 
attorneys pen the very decisions that impact their lives and livelihoods.”  Id. at 332.  CFTC decisions 
are the product of ex parte motions for restraining orders that are, as with the complaint, filed under 
seal. 
 189 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See infra Appendices I–III. 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss3/5
2012] Legitimizing CFTC Expedited Discovery 421 
 
the rule’s structure and text from the doctrine’s development, thereby 
trivializing 26(d)(1)’s significance and ignoring the doctrine’s status as 
an exception.  Instead of looking to 26(d)(1) when considering a CFTC 
request, courts tacitly consult an extra-textual factor: the movant’s 
identity.192  When the CFTC requests early discovery, it is irrelevant 
whether such relief is commensurate with 26(d)(1)’s guidelines.  Instead, 
what matters is that the CFTC is seeking accelerated relief, transforming 
an explicit exception into the rule.193 
F. SUMMARY: ILLEGITIMATE INTERPRETIVE TESTS BREED 
ILLEGITIMATE DECISIONS 
Discretion without explanation, Good Cause, and the four 
occasional alternatives are interpretive tests that override 26(d)(1).  They 
are illegitimate, generating decisions that overlook the rule’s general 
prohibition, discretionary exception, primary and secondary conduct, 
references to actors, and timeframe.  As for CFTC-written decisions—
the embodiment of these illegitimate processes—their core features 
amount to Boilerplate Justice, where independent juridical analysis has 
been traded in for mechanized acquiescence, resulting in the 
Commission’s unrivaled success with obtaining expedited discovery. 
For the past eleven years, the CFTC has obtained expedited 
discovery with astounding success because courts have ceded the 
doctrine to the CFTC, tilting what should be an interpretive endeavor to 
almost always favoring the Commission.  This is not the playing field set 
by 26(d)(1).  This is not the discretionary approach the rule’s 
perpetuation demands.  This is, instead, nothing more than a doctrine’s 
illegitimate development, the invariable outcome of what has become an 
entrenched abdication of the judicial process. 
III. THE HISTORICAL BLUEPRINT: HOW COURTS CAN LEGITIMIZE 
CFTC EXPEDITED DISCOVERY 
Rescuing Expedited Discovery I analyzed the doctrine’s forgotten 
history.194  Particular attention was given to the transformative era, a 
collection of decisions rendered and principles cultivated from 1939 to 
 192 See infra Appendix I. 
 193 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nations Inv., LLC, No. 07-CV-61058-
RWS, at 5 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 2007); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Sonoma Trading 
Corp., No. 05-60342, 2005 WL 3742849, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2005); Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Smithers, No. 05-CV-80592-DTKH, at 4 (S.D. Fla. filed June 30, 2005), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfsmithersorder.pdf. 
 194 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 676-89. 
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1948.195  The transformative era furnished an analytical blueprint for 
legitimizing expedited discovery.196  The blueprint fosters legitimacy by 
embracing the doctrine’s traditional principles and internalizing 
26(d)(1)’s structure and text.197  The aim is to ensure that courts assess 
expedited discovery’s propriety in accordance with 26(d)(1)’s parameters 
by engaging in rule-based development.198 
This Part shows how courts can legitimize CFTC expedited 
discovery by starting with a review of the historical blueprint and 
traditional principles.  Next, the blueprint is applied to CFTC expedited 
discovery.  Finally, context-specific suggestions are offered, unique to 
CFTC discovery, that will eliminate Boilerplate Justice.  The blueprint 
delineated in Rescuing Expedited Discovery I is, in this Article, utilized 
to rescue the doctrine from the CFTC and return it to 26(d)(1). 
A. A TEMPLATE FOR LEGITIMACY: THE BLUEPRINT & TRADITIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 
During the transformative era, expedited discovery experienced two 
strands of development; the first involved courts, the second implicated 
litigants.199  The blueprint incorporated these strands by limiting early 
discovery “[t]o two categories: (1) instances when a court will make a 
decision before a 26(f) conference; and (2) scenarios where something 
will happen that makes taking early discovery absolutely necessary.”200  
Each category asks five questions. 
1. The Historical Blueprint’s Category Two 
CFTC expedited discovery effectively concerns why the 
Commission needs accelerated relief, triggering Category Two: 
 
1. Is something going to happen that makes taking discovery 
now—before the 26(f) conference—absolutely necessary? 
 195 Id. at 676-81. 
 196 Id. at 689. 
 197 Id. at 692-95. 
 198 Rule-based development is the understanding that “[t]he doctrine’s development must be 
tethered to the procedural rule authorizing early discovery.”  Id. at 676. 
 199 The first strand dealt with courts’ need for discovery before rendering a decision, usually 
on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  The second concerned litigants’ immediate need for 
discovery—something was going to happen that made taking discovery now necessary.  See id. at 
690-92. 
 200 Id. at 690. 
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2. What is the proof or evidence of the event and its 
consequences? 
3. Will expedited discovery avoid the event’s consequences? 
4. Is the requested discovery’s scope confined to the event, 
evading the event’s consequences, the time available to 
conduct discovery, and the time remaining before the event 
occurs? 
5. What will happen if expedited discovery is denied?201 
 
These five questions perpetuate 26(d)(1)’s structure and text and the 
doctrine’s traditional principles: necessity, discretion, scope, and 
prejudice. 202 
2. The Traditional Principles 
The principle of necessity asked why a litigant needed discovery 
immediately; the “need” must not simply be stated, but proven.203  
Discretion fostered procedural regularity, with courts refusing to expand 
the concept of “need” unduly.204  Scope helped litigants prove that a 
discovery request was genuine and not abusive; the professed Necessity 
must be reflected in the discovery sought.205  Prejudice scrutinized 
consequences, what would happen to a litigant if discovery requests were 
denied.206 
These principles, along with 26(d)(1)’s structure and text, animate 
the historical blueprint.  Thus, if courts apply the blueprint to CFTC 
requests, then they will be utilizing an interpretive test that directs their 
attention to 26(d)(1)’s details, thereby exercising discretion 
commensurate with that rule. 
B. LEGITIMACY THROUGH HISTORY: APPLYING THE BLUEPRINT TO 
CFTC EXPEDITED DISCOVERY 
Most decisions involving CFTC expedited discovery requests do not 
describe why the Commission needs expedited discovery—the express 
reason why discovery must occur before the 26(f) conference.207  Though 
 201 Id. at 691. 
 202 Id. at 691-92. 
 203 Id. at 682-83. 
 204 Id. at 683-84. 
 205 Id. at 685-86. 
 206 Id. at 686-87. 
 207 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. PrivateFX Global One Ltd., SA, No. 09-CV-  
—— -SL, at 3, 14 (S.D. Tex. filed May 21, 2009), available at 
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courts often enumerate how the CFTC may use the information once it is 
discovered, courts do not mention or inquire into the Commission’s need 
for pre-26(f) discovery.208  This omission is fatal under the blueprint, 
failing to satisfy the first question which would render the remaining 
inquiries moot.  Nevertheless, in order to show courts how to apply the 
blueprint, this Article suggests some of the more likely reasons that the 
Commission could offer for needing expedited discovery: asset depletion 
and document destruction.  These reasons are drawn from, and correlate 
with, the types of discovery that the CFTC routinely requests as well as 
the topics such discovery covers. 
1. Question One: The Pre-26(f) Event 
The blueprint’s first question asks, “[w]ill something happen that 
makes taking discovery before the 26(f) conference absolutely 
necessary?”209  CFTC decisions often mention asset dissipation and 
document destruction as justifications for granting restraining orders that 
impose asset freezes, document preservation, and document 
investigation.210  If a defendant will transfer assets or destroy documents 
before the 26(f) conference, then both would be compelling pre-26(f) 
events that might make taking discovery “absolutely necessary.”  This is 
so because the CFTC could argue that without immediate discovery, 
assets may be hidden or documentary evidence could be destroyed. 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfprivatefxorde
r05212009.pdf (sealed); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. CRW Mgmt. LP, No. 3:09-
CV-0408-EK, at 3, 15 (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 4, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcrworder0304
2009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Walsh, No. 09-CV-1749-GBD, at 3, 16-17 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfwalshorder02
252009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Rolando, No. 08-CV- —— -PCD, at 2-3, 
12 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 15, 2008), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfrolandosrorde
r.pdf. 
 208 PrivateFX Global One Ltd., SA, No. 09-CV-  —— -SL, at 14 (sealed).  Common examples 
of how the Commission will use discovery or the purposes discovery will serve include determining 
the full extent of a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing, locating a defendant’s customers, and clarifying 
various funds’ sources.  Id.  These examples do not address why the Commission has a pressing 
need—one that must be satisfied before the 26(f) conference—for expedited discovery. 
 209 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 691. 
 210 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Supama Int’l DMCC, No. 07-CV-2770-
RJH, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 5, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfsupamaorder.
pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Rodriguez, No. 06-CV-0855-KMW, at *2-3 
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In contrast, CFTC decisions also note that early discovery will 
enable the Commission to fulfill its statutory duties, determine the full 
extent of a defendant’s wrongdoing, and protect investors or customers 
from further harm—examples of how the CFTC will use discovery or the 
purposes discovery will serve.211  These examples, however, would not 
satisfy the blueprint’s first inquiry, as none provides a specific or 
concrete event that is likely to occur before the 26(f) meeting.  
Furthermore, such examples—if offered by the CFTC as to why it needs 
early discovery—contravene 26(d)(1).  Vague statutory duties could be 
invoked in every case, thereby eviscerating 26(d)(1)’s discretionary 
exception.  Determining a defendant’s wrongdoing outstrips the rule’s 
timeframe, an aim that should instead play itself out over a lawsuit’s 
duration.  And protecting investors or customers from further harm is an 
aim that defies the rule’s primary conduct and its connection with 
discovery’s practical and foundational purposes.212 
2. Question Two: Proof of the Pre-26(f) Event 
Asset dissipation and document destruction must be proven rather 
than merely alleged.213  It would not be enough for the CFTC to 
announce, even in the form of a declaration, that it has some generalized 
reason to believe that a defendant, or a non-party, will hide assets or 
destroy documents before the 26(f) conference.  Particularized proof 
must be offered to a court. 
3. Question Three: Avoiding the Event’s Consequences 
Expedited discovery’s advisability, under the blueprint’s third 
question, turns on whether discovery will help a movant avoid the 
event’s consequences.214  The Commission would have to show that 
early discovery would evade pre-26(f) asset depletion or document 
destruction. 
 211 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Owen, No. 3:09cv484/MCR/EMT, 2009 
WL 4781903, at *1-2, *4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
M25 Inc., No. 3–09–cv–1831–M, 2009 WL 3740627, at *1, *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Khanna, No. 09cv1783 BEN (CAB), 2009 WL 3415352, at 
*2, *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Barki, LLC, No. 
3:09CV106, 2009 WL 1203409, at *2, *8 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Donnelly, No. 3:09CV00016, 2009 WL 890615, at *2, *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 11, 
2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Sun Platinum Grp., LLC, No. 03 CV 7112, 
2003 WL 22469913, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2003). 
 212 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 686 n.195. 
 213 See id. at 683. 
 214 Id. at 691. 
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4. Question Four: The Requested Discovery’s Scope 
Assuming the CFTC has satisfactorily described and proven a pre-
26(f) event, and documented how expedited discovery would help avoid 
the event’s consequences, the CFTC’s discovery requests cannot be 
unbound.  The methods sought to be used along with the breadth of 
information desired must be confined to “[t]he event, evading the event’s 
consequences, the time available to conduct discovery, and the time 
remaining before the event occurs.”215  Discovery’s scope, in other 
words, must reflect the CFTC’s need.  This proportionality would be a 
substantial change for the Commission, deviating from the expansive 
discovery courts routinely allow. 
Since 2000, CFTC expedited discovery has been achieved in three 
ways.  First, courts have allowed the CFTC to engage in undefined 
“discovery,” the limits of which are seemingly set by the Commission.216  
Second, courts have consistently authorized customized depositions.  
These customized depositions allow for more than the standard ten total 
depositions,217 an unlimited ability to re-depose a deponent,218 
depositions that last more than seven hours,219 and deposing prisoners.220  
Third, defendants have less than thirty days to respond to requests for 
production of documents.221  Such discovery—authorized without courts 
substantially delving into applicable procedural rules—is ungainly, and 
under the fourth question would have to be refined. 
 215 Id. 
 216 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weinberg, No. 02-02094-CV-RSWL-RNB, 
at *2, *8 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 2002), available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/02orders/enfweinberg-
sro.pdf. 
 217 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Efrosman, No. 05 Civ.8422 KMW, 2005 
WL 3832923, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 30, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Eustace, No. 05CV2973, 2005 WL 3740316, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2005). 
 218 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cromwell Fin. Serv., Inc., No. Civ. 05-CV-
210-JD, 2005 WL 3724872, at *2 (D.N.H. 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Fleury, No. 03-61199-CIV, 2003 WL 22359517, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2003). 
 219 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yellowstone Partners, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-
85-FL, 2010 WL 1780005, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2010); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Smith, No. 1:10CV00009, 2010 WL 1759542, at *2, *4–5 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2010). 
 220 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kim, No. 11 CIV 1013, 2011 WL 554105, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Valko, No. 06-60001-
CIV, 2006 WL 2620197, at *4 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 3, 2006); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Lake Dow Capital, LLC, No. 05-CV-2709, 2005 WL 3741510, at *6-7 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 
19, 2005); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Bristol Grp., Inc., No. 02-61160, 2002 WL 
31357411, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2002). 
 221 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Driver, No. SA 09-cv-0578 ODW (RZx), 
2009 WL 3396172, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Pippin, No. CV 05-4120, 2005 WL 3741535, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005). 
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The Commission’s discovery, the breadth of information sought, 
and the methods requested to be used must be calibrated to asset 
dissipation or document destruction.  More precisely, the CFTC’s 
proposed discovery must be limited to the event, evading the event’s 
consequences, the time available to conducting discovery, and the time 
remaining before the event occurs.222  This precision is essential in order 
to preserve 26(d)(1)’s timeframe. 
5. Question Five: The Consequences of Denying Expedited Discovery 
Even if the Commission can satisfactorily answer the blueprint’s 
four questions, the CFTC will still have to grapple with “[w]hat will 
happen if expedited discovery is denied?”223  It is at this point that the 
CFTC would face its greatest obstacle in obtaining accelerated relief.  
This is so because of 13a-1 and the restraining orders courts usually grant 
the Commission.224 
Recall that the most prevalent reasons that courts issue restraining 
orders are to prevent asset dissipation and document destruction.225  In 
fact, 13a-1’s text explicitly addresses these concerns, which in part is 
 222 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 691. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Under question 3, expedited discovery may avoid asset depletion or document destruction.  
But these outcomes are also achievable—for the CFTC—through statutory means.  Thus, under 
question 5, if expedited discovery is denied, then the CFTC would still be able to obtain the identical 
outcomes that expedited discovery may effectuate.  In the non-CFTC context, consider a would-be 
deponent who a movant claims is terminally ill but cannot so prove with any documentary evidence.  
The movant requests expedited discovery, arguing that the would-be deponent will likely die before 
the 26(f) meeting, making it impossible to obtain the deponent’s testimony unless the deposition 
occurs before the 26(f) meeting.  So, under question 3, a deposition (expedited discovery) would 
avoid the alleged outcome: the loss of the would-be deponent’s testimony.  However, a court—in its 
discretion—may determine that because of insufficient evidence (e.g., no proof of a terminal illness), 
denying expedited discovery will not preclude the movant from conducting a post-26(f) deposition.  
Under those circumstances, the event (the loss of the would-be deponent’s testimony) is unlikely to 
occur if the deposition is not taken before the 26(f) conference.  See, e.g., Paul v. Aviva Life & 
Annuity Co., No. 3-09-CV-1490-B, 2009 WL 3815949, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2009) (denying 
motion for expedited discovery after would-be deponent stated in a sworn declaration that he had no 
reason to believe that his medical condition would prevent him from testifying a year later); Borom 
v. Merrillville, No. 2:07 CV 98, 2007 WL 1797639, at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 19, 2007) (finding that age 
of eighty-year-old witness, without more evidence regarding his health, was insufficient to grant 
expedited discovery). 
 225 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smith, No. 1:10CV00009, 2010 WL 
1759542, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2010); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Milton, No. 10-
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why courts (i) freeze defendants’ assets;226 (ii) prohibit defendants from 
destroying books, records, and documents;227 (iii) give the CFTC access 
to these same informational sources;228 (iv) compel defendants to 
identify and preserve their assets;229 (v) require financial institutions to 
deny defendants access to their accounts;230 and (vi) force additional 
non-parties to divulge information germane to defendants’ alleged 
violations.231 
Hence, 13a-1 restraining orders contemplate most, if not all, of the 
untoward consequences of denying the CFTC asset or document 
discovery requests.  Specifically, if a court denies the CFTC such 
discovery, then—because of 13a-1 restraining orders’ sweeping 
provisions—the consequences will not be as dire as in the absence of 
these orders.  Frozen assets cannot be transferred.  Unfettered access to a 
defendant’s documents “wherever they may be situated and whether they 
are in the possession of any of the Defendants or others”232 frustrates 
document destruction.  And restraining orders are granted ex parte, 
issued under seal, and thus can be effectuated quickly, before a defendant 
has time to react.  The blueprint’s fifth and final inquiry would force the 
CFTC—and more importantly courts—to seriously evaluate expedited 
discovery’s propriety. 
Underlying the fifth question is the traditional principle of prejudice 
and 26(d)(1)’s discretionary exception.233  This principle and the 
discretionary exception emphasize that the doctrine is an exception to the 
 226 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. U.S. Ventures LC, No. 2:11-CV-00099-BSJ, 
at 4 (D. Utah filed Jan. 25, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfwinsomeorde
r012511.pdf. 
 227 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Klatch, No. 1:11-cv-05191-GBD, at 6 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 3, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfklatchorder08
0311.pdf. 
 228 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. El Rhazi, No. 11-cv-02576-DLC, at 6-7 
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 29, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfelrhaziorder0
72911.pdf. 
 229 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Funding Ass’n, No. CV031826PHXPGR, 
2003 WL 22469911, at *2-3 (D. Alaska Sept. 18, 2003). 
 230 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Tech Inst., No. 11-CV-02163-GHK-
PLA, at 7-9 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 15, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enftradetechorde
r031511.pdf. 
 231 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Groover, No. 4:11-CV-64, 2011 WL 
1490901, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011). 
 232 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kim, No. 11 CIV 1013, 2011 WL 554105, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011). 
 233 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 691-92. 
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rule, a categorization that means accelerated relief should be denied more 
frequently than it is allowed—the traditional interaction between a rule 
and its exception.234 
6. The Practical & Theoretical Ramifications of Denying Expedited 
Discovery 
A decision to deny expedited discovery235 affirms the doctrine’s 
status as an exception, respects 26(d)(1)’s general prohibition, maintains 
the rule’s treatment of actors, focuses primary conduct on discovery’s 
foundational purposes, gives direction and boundaries to the secondary 
conduct of authorizing accelerated relief, and advances 26(d)(1)’s 
timeframe.  The decision to grant or to deny a motion for expedited 
discovery reserves one of law’s most dynamic tools for those instances 
where a litigant’s needs are so compelling that discovery must occur 
before the rule 26(f) conference.  It is this understanding of the practical 
and theoretical ramifications of a denial that the historical blueprint 
respects because it is an understanding that permeates 26(d)(1)’s 
structural and textual nuances.236 
C. PRACTICAL REFORMS FOR A PRACTICAL DOCTRINE: THE DEMISE 
OF BOILERPLATE JUSTICE 
The historical blueprint pursues legitimacy by giving courts a 
framework that helps them exercise discretion commensurate with the 
structure and text of 26(d)(1).  Within the CFTC context, however, 
several practical steps—unique to CFTC early discovery—can be taken 
to promote the doctrine’s legitimate development.  These steps reflect 
modern exigencies, current realities that were not present during the 
transformative era. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine’s flexibility—its capacity to respond to 
litigants’ and courts’ needs—allows for such accommodation, speaking 
to 26(d)(1)’s practical-responsiveness.237  The steps that follow are 
 234 Ross v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 625 F.3d 808, 816 (4th Cir. 2010); Choice Hotels Int’l, 
Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 235 “Decision” refers to judicial determinations in general, and CFTC expedited discovery 
decisions (written orders) in particular. 
 236 See Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 691-92. 
 237 See generally Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“In the search for truth through the slow process of inclusion and exclusion, involving trial and 
error, it behooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions upon such questions which prove to have been 
mistaken.”), overruled by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); see also Jaybird Mining 
Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 619 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is a peculiar virtue of our 
system of law that the process of inclusion and exclusion, so often employed in developing a rule, is 
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designed to eliminate Boilerplate Justice, an assembly-line approach to 
adjudication where judges abandon the very analytical independence 
26(d)(1) demands. 
1. Judge-Written Decisions 
The first step toward legitimacy is judge-written decisions, a reform 
that would overturn two recurring traits of Boilerplate Justice: 
homogeneity and CFTC-written decisions.  If judges write CFTC 
expedited discovery decisions, then variety would occur, bringing an end 
to eleven years of decisions that are nearly identical structurally and 
substantively.  On a slightly different level, judge-written decisions 
would preserve a more detailed record on appeal, as they would explicate 
why a judge denied or authorized early discovery.238  Additionally, 
judge-written decisions would affirm the general assumption that 
attorneys argue and judges decide, bolstering participants’ willingness to 
accept and to follow a court’s determinatio 239
2. Quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) 
As for 26(d)(1), it should be quoted in CFTC decisions, a precursor 
to and a prerequisite of thoughtful interpretation and application.  Rules 
are not to be understood by their corresponding numbers but are to be 
comprehended through their structure and text, a process thwarted when 
a rule is not quoted.  The systematic failure to quote 26(d)(1) belies a 
cavalier approach to expedited discovery, one that places too little value 
in a rule too invaluable to ignore.  Quoting 26(d)(1) affirms that rule’s 
centrality in ascertaining expedited discovery’s propriety, a discretionary 
determination to allow or to deny pre-26(f) discovery.  Judge-written 
decisions and quoting 26(d)(1) are practical reforms for a practical 
not allowed to end with its enunciation, and that an expression in an opinion yields later to the 
impact of facts unforeseen.”); Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236 (1924) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The process of inclusion and exclusion, so often applied in developing a 
rule, cannot end with its first enunciation.  The rule as announced must be deemed tentative. For the 
many and varying facts to which it will be applied cannot be foreseen.  Modification implies growth.  
It is the life of the law.”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 138 (Yale University 
Press 1963) (1924) (referencing Justice Brandeis’s process of inclusion and exclusion) (quoting W.C. 
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 236). 
 238 Homogeneous decisions, by nature and definition, omit detailed analysis, leaving appellate 
courts guessing about the rationale behind any given decision.  See generally Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd. 496 F.3d 769, 770 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The judge did 
not explain her reason for issuing the order or the thinking behind the asset freeze in particular.”). 
 239 Jesse N. Panoff, Why State Trial Court Judges Should Write Their Own Decisions: 
Transforming the Current System, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 331-32 (2009). 
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doctrine, the development of which can be legitimized through the 
historical blueprint. 
IV. THE IMPERATIVE FOR LEGITIMACY: WHY COURTS SHOULD 
RETURN CFTC EXPEDITED DISCOVERY TO FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) 
CFTC expedited discovery is a microcosm of courts’ systemic 
illegitimate development of expedited discovery.240  While the need for 
legitimacy permeates multiple legal contexts, it is felt especially acutely 
within CFTC expedited discovery, owing to an unprecedented doctrinal 
expansion that can only be described as excessive. 
Legitimacy is imperative not because of theoretical impulses, but 
instead due to practical reasons.  Those reasons are explored below, the 
collective import of which is an urgency for legitimacy, to be heeded by 
courts and hastened by a restoration of the judicial function that is so 
pivotal to confronting the very problems 26(d)(1) can help resolve. 
A. THE ECONOMY, SWAPS, & ACHIEVABLE IMPROVEMENT: THE 
REASONS FOR LEGITIMACY 
As Rescuing Expedited Discovery I observed, the doctrine’s 
“[l]egitimacy is vital because 26(d)(1) is impacting today’s most pressing 
issues.  If the doctrine is illegitimate, then so too will be its results, 
casting doubt on decisions too important to undermine.”241  CFTC 
decisions are important because they involve markets that contributed to 
this country’s economic crises. 
1. CFTC Decisions’ Impact on the Economy 
The $40 trillion commodity futures and options markets—volatile 
and susceptible to abuse—were some of the forces behind this country’s 
financial woes.242  The interconnectivity between these markets and our 
society’s financial concerns is considerable; when courts rule on CFTC 
requests for expedited discovery, they are making determinations that 
influence this country’s economy, a significant consequence deserving 
careful and thoughtful deliberation. 
 240 Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery I, at 671-73. 
 241 Id. at 689. 
 242 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Bringing 
Transparency to the Swaps Markets ¶ 9, Remarks at the National Association of Corporate 
Treasurers Conference (June 2, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-83.html). 
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2. The $300 Trillion Swaps Market 
CFTC decisions’ interrelatedness with the economy is about to 
grow by 300 trillion dollars, the swaps market’s approximate value.243  
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress has entrusted the 
CFTC with over-the-counter derivatives.244  This expanded authority will 
likely result in an increased number of CFTC expedited discovery 
requests.  In turn, courts will be issuing more decisions that have a 
bearing on yet another crucial financial market, further enhancing the 
impact these decisions have on the economy.  Either courts can continue 
to allow the Commission unfettered discovery that contravenes 26(d)(1), 
or courts can hold the CFTC to the details and limits embodied in that 
rule’s structure and text.  Whichever way courts move, the decisions they 
render will have consequences for more peoples’ lives and livelihoods, 
given the Commission’s expanded power over swaps. 
3. Achievable Legitimacy 
In addition to impacting the economy and the CFTC’s new authority 
over swaps, there is a further rationale for legitimizing CFTC expedited 
discovery: The CFTC expedited discovery context is amenable to 
legitimization, a fertile ground for advances that will strengthen a 
doctrine equipped to help courts and litigants respond to some of our 
time’s gravest challenges.  Again, expedited discovery’s illegitimacy is 
astoundingly pervasive, spanning diverse legal areas and topics; the 
CFTC arena is but a subset of a much larger doctrinal morass.  And yet, 
this niche area of the law—given its comparatively narrow focus—is 
well suited to embrace and make adjustments essential to the doctrine’s 
vitality, alterations that will show courts in other legal fields how to 
develop the doctrine more in keeping with 26(d)(1). 
For starters, context-specific alterations such as judge-written 
decisions and quoting 26(d)(1) are readily achievable reforms that fuse 
26(d)(1) with the doctrine’s development.  Applying the historical 
blueprint will harmonize discretion with 26(d)(1)’s structure and text, 
yielding decisions that respect rather than replace that rule, eventually 
fostering rule-based development.  The CFTC context provides courts 
with a unique opportunity to legitimize expedited discovery by applying 
the blueprint to discovery requests that have for the past eleven years 
 243 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CHAIRMAN’S TRANSMITTAL LETTER, 
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET & PERFORMANCE PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcbudget2012.pdf. 
 244 Id. 
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eclipsed 26(d)(1).  Legitimizing CFTC expedited discovery would be the 
germination of a much larger process of reuniting a useful doctrine with 
its legal source. 
CONCLUSION 
Those who violate the CEA should be brought to justice for harms 
inflicted on individuals and on markets.  In the pursuit of civil justice, the 
CFTC has an array of information-gathering tools critical to achieving 
accountability.  Recordkeeping, registration, inspection, and 
investigation aid the CFTC in regulating trillion-dollar markets and 
enforcing the CEA, the statutory basis for such data-collecting 
mechanisms.  Particularly, and as it relates to enforcement, 7 U.S.C. § 
13a-1 is a powerful positive law, with its efficacy turning on courts’ 
textual and structural fidelity. 
The same holds for 26(d)(1) and the dynamic doctrine emanating 
from that rule: expedited discovery.  The doctrine’s vitality depends on 
courts’ adherence to 26(d)(1)’s structure and text; expedited discovery is 
neither a stand-alone judicial creation nor a featureless device to be used 
as a governmental body—such as the CFTC—desires.  It is the product 
of a procedural rule’s particularized features, deserving of the same 
respect and adherence afforded 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1.  Unfortunately, courts 
have all but erased 26(d)(1) from CFTC expedited discovery.  The 
doctrine’s development—dictated not by courts but by the CFTC, shaped 
not by a procedural rule’s contours but by the Commission’s desire for 
information—is illegitimate, as evidenced by eleven years’ worth of 
decisions that have denied the CFTC pre-26(f) discovery only twice. 
The CFTC’s unmatched record does not, in and of itself, establish 
illegitimacy; it is illegitimacy’s result, not its cause.  Rather, 
illegitimacy’s cause is an all-too-complicit federal judiciary that has 
relinquished 26(d)(1) to the CFTC, signing off on CFTC-authored 
decisions that sometimes permit boundless “discovery” without any 
articulated justification.  This is not expedited discovery; it is excessive 
discovery.  This is not discretion; it is abdication.  This is not the rule-
based development courts cultivated during the doctrine’s transformative 
era, the analytical genesis behind Rescuing Expedited Discovery I’s 
historical blueprint. 
In the end, the blueprint shows courts how to legitimize CFTC 
expedited discovery.  With the Commission’s added authority over the 
swaps market and the significant impact CFTC decisions have on this 
country’s economy, the call for legitimacy cannot be louder; it is a call 
that must now be heard and acted upon by courts, those responsible for 
the doctrine’s development, those empowered with the requisite 
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Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss3/5
2012] Legitimizing CFTC Expedited Discovery 435 
APPENDIX I: DISCRETION WITHOUT EXPLANATION 
 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Driver, No. SA 09-cv-
0578 ODW (RZx), 2009 WL 3396172, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2009); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Liberty Mut., No. 1:07-CV-
21267-JAL, at 6-7 (S.D. Fla. filed May 16, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfsupamaorder.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Nations Inv., LLC, No. 07-CV-61058-RWS, at *5 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 
31, 2007), available at http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lren 
forcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfnationsorder073007.pdf; 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cornerstone Capital 
Mgmt., LLC, No. 07-CV-0274-RWS, at *17-18 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 31, 
2007), available at http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/ 
@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcornerstoneorder.pd
f; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Valko, 2006 WL 
2620197, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Sonoma Trading Corp., No. 05-60342, 2005 WL 3742849, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Mar. 9, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Lake 
Dow Capital, LLC, No. 05-CV-2709, 2005 WL 3741510, at *6-7 (N.D. 
Ga. Oct. 20, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. E-
Metal Merch., Inc., 2005 WL 3741509, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2005); 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cromwell Fin. Serv., Inc., 
No. Civ. 05-CV-210-JD, 2005 WL 3724872, at *2 (D.N.H. June 13, 
2005); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smithers, No. 05-CV-
80592-DTKH, at *4 (S.D. Fla. filed June 30, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/ enfsmithersorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Mercury Partners, Inc., No. 05-CV-60328-
CMA, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 7, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfmercury-order.pdf; U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Derivatives Corp., No. 05-CV-7192-
RWS, at *8-9 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 26, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfamericanderi vativesorder.pdf; U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Berkshire Grp. Holdings, 
Inc., No. 05-CV-61588-CMA, at *9 (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 29, 2005), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfberkshireas 
setfreezeorder.pdf (sealed); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Saume, No. 05-CV-61903-KM, at *7 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 13, 2005), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfinvertrust 
assetfreezeorder.pdf (filed under seal); Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Lexington Royce & Assocs., No. 04 CV 02768, 2004 WL 
856460, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Remco Cap. Mgmt., Inc., No. 04-CV-9029-KMW, 
43
Panoff,: Legitimizing CFTC Expedited Discovery
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
436 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 16, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enf-remcocapital-order.pdf; U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schotz, No. 04-CV-8889-SJO, 
at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 27, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enf-schotz-sro.pdf; U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Foreign Fund, No. 04-CV-0898-RLE, at *6-
7 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 5, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enf-freezeforeignfund-order.pdf; U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Liberty Grp., Inc., No. 04-
CV-7609-RWS, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sep. 27, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enffirstliberty_order.pdf (filed under 
seal); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Next Fin. Serv. 
Unlimited, Inc., No. 04-CV-80562-KLR, at *2, *8 (S.D. Fla. filed June 
23, 2004), available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/ 
enfnext_financial-order.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. FX First, Inc., No. SACV 03-1454-JVS, 2003 WL 
23195524, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2003) (consent order); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. A.S. Templeton Grp., Inc., No. 
Civ. 03–4999, 2003 WL 23190194, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2003); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Sun Platinum Grp., LLC, No. 
03 CV 7112, 2003 WL 22469913, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2003); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Funding Ass’n, No. 
CV031826PHXPGR, 2003 WL 22469911, at *2-3 (D. Alaska Sept. 18, 
2003); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Fleury, No. 03-
61199-CIV, 2003 WL 22359517, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2003); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Investors Freedom Club, L.C., 
No. 8:03-CV-54-T-17TGW, at *5 (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 13, 2003), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/03orders/enfifc-order.pdf (sealed); 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Global Fin. Consulting, 
Inc., No. 1:02-CV-2394, 2002 WL 31357171, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 
2002); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Advent Capital 
Partners, Ltd., No. 1:02-CV-1381, 2002 WL 31357169, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
May 22, 2002); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Fin. 
Serv. (New York) Inc., No. 02–CIV.5497 GEL, 2002 WL 1801723, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2002); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Luger, No. 02-80435, 2002 WL 1789768, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 3, 2002); 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Offshore Fin. Consultants 
of Fla., Inc., No. Civ.A. 02–60769, 2002 WL 1788031, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 
June 5, 2002); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Bullion & Coin, Inc., No. 00-6885-CV-ZLOCH, at *16-17 (S.D. Fla. 
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APPENDIX II: THE GOOD-CAUSE TEST 
 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Groover, No. 4:11-CV-64, 
2011 WL 1490901, at *2, *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. PMC Strategy, LLC, No. 3:11CV73, 2011 
WL 564293, at *1, *5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2011); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kim, No. 11 CIV 1013, 2011 WL 554105, 
at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Klatch, No. 1:11-cv-05191-GBD, at *2, *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Aug. 3, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfklatchorder080311.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Fin. Robotics, No. 11-CV-2446-LR, at *2, *15 (S.D. Tex. 
filed June 30, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enffinroborder063011.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. ACJ Capital, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01419-JAF, at *3, *8 
(D.P.R. filed May 4, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfacjcapitalorder050411.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. El Rhazi, No. 11-cv-02576-
DLC, at *2-8 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 29, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfelrhaziorder072911.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Trade Tech Inst., No. 11-CV-02163-GHK-PLA, at *4, *11-
12 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 15, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enftradetechorder031511.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Watson, No. 2:11-cv-10949-LPZ-MKM, at *3, *15 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 11, 2011) (sealed); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Jade Inv. Grp., LLC, No. 3:11-CV-00128-WMC, at *3, *9-
10 (W.D. Wis. 2011) (sealed) (details of decision regarding discovery 
redacted); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Simmons, No. 
3:11-CV-00023-RJC-DCK, at *3, *8 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2011); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. U.S. Ventures LC, No. 2:11-
CV-00099-BSJ, at *2-3, *14 (D. Utah filed Jan. 25, 2011), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfwinsomeorder012511.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Yellowstone Partners, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-85-FL, 
2010 WL 1780005, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2010).; U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smith, No. 1:10CV00009, 2010 
WL 1759542, at *2, *4-5 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2010); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Satterfield, No. 2:10-CV-02893-RMG, at *7 
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(D.S.C. filed Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfgrahamorder110910.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. People’s Alt., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-07013-GAF-E, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. filed Sept. 22, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfpeoplesorder092210.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Midwest Land & Livestock, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-
02490-EFM-KGG, at *2, *8 (D. Kan. filed Sept. 13, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfvanderploegorder09132010.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yancy, No. 4:10-CV-2955-
KPE, at *2, *9-10 (S.D. Tex. filed Aug. 18, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfyancyorder08182010.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Milton, No. 10-CV-80738-KAM, at *2-3, *7-8 (S.D. Fla. 
filed June 22, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enftradeorder06222010.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Aliaga, No. 1:10-CV-21074-MGC, at *3, *7 (S.D. Fla. filed 
Apr. 9, 2010), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfcmaorder04092010.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Owen, No. 3:09cv484/MCR/EMT, 2009 WL 4781903, at *1-
2, *4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. M25 Inc., No. 3–09–cv–1831–M, 2009 WL 3740627, at *1, 
*6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Khanna, No. 09cv1783 BEN (CAB), 2009 WL 3415352, at 
*2, *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Barki, LLC, No. 3:09CV106, 2009 WL 1203409, at *2, *8 
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Donnelly, No. 3:09CV00016, 2009 WL 890615, at *2, *5 (W.D. Va. 
Mar. 11, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Billion 
Coupons, Inc., No. 09–00069 JMS/LEK, 2009 WL 690092, at *1, *7 (D. 
Haw. Feb. 18, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Atwood & James, Ltd., No. 09 CV 6032, 2009 WL 666970, at *1, *5 
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Prestige Ventures Corp., No. 5:09-cv-01284-R, at *3, *16 (W.D. Okla. 
filed Nov. 20, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfprestigeorder11202009.pdf (sealed); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Capitalstreet Fin., LLC, No. 3:09-CV-387-
RJC, at *3, 6-7 (W.D.N.C. filed Sept. 9, 2009), available at 
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http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfcapitalstreetorder09092009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Queen Shoals, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-335-RJC, at *4, 
*10-11 (W.D.N.C. filed Aug. 7, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfqueenshoalssro08072009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Healy, No. 1:09-CV-1331-CCC, at *19-20 (M.D. 
Pa. filed July 13, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfhealyorder07132009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Gresham, No. 3:09-CV-508-JC, at *3-4, *12-13 
(N.D. Ga. filed July 2, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfgreshamorder07022009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Strongbow Inv. GP, LLC, No. 09-CV-497-SS, at *3, 
*10 (W.D. Tex. filed June 30, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfstrongboworder06302009.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. SNC Asset Mgmt., No. 09-CV-
2555-MMC, at *3, *9 (N.D. Cal. filed June 10, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfsncassetsro06102009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. PrivateFX Global One Ltd., SA, No. 09-CV-  —— -
SL, at *3, *14 (S.D. Tex. filed May 21, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfprivatefxorder05212009.pdf (sealed); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Capital Blu Mgmt., LLC, No. 6:09-CV-508-
JA, at *3, 16 (M.D. Fla. filed Mar. 23, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfcapitalbluorder03232009.pdf (filed under seal); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. CRW Mgmt. LP, No. 3:09-CV-
0408-EK, at *3, *15 (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 4, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfcrworder03042009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Palmer, No. 1:09-CV-00076-EJL, at *2, *14 (D. Idaho filed 
Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfpalmerorder02262009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Walsh, No. 09-CV-1749-GBD, at *3, *16-17 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfwalshorder02252009.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Forte, No. 09-CV-00064-PSD, at *2-3, *9 (E.D. Pa. 
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filed Jan. 7, 2009), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfforteorder09302009.pdf (consent order); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Bame, No. CV08–05593, 2008 WL 
4377126, at *1, *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Sucarato, No. 08-CV-1932-JBS, at *3, 11 (D. N.J. 
filed Apr. 22, 2008), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfsucaratoorder042208.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Cocoon Trade Inc., No. 08-CV-789-DKC, at *2-3, 
*8-9 (D. Md. filed Apr. 4, 2008), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfcocoonsro040408.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Rolando, No. 08-CV-00064-MRK, at *2-3, *12 (D. Conn. 
filed Jan. 15, 2008), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfrolandosrorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Heierle, No. 07-22396-CIV, 2007 WL 4351424, at *1-2, *5 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2007); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Supama Int’l DMCC, No. 07-CV-2770-RJH, at *2, *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
5, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfsupamaorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Kis, No. CIVA 3:06-0935, 2006 WL 3707872, at *1, *4 
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 6, 2006); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Rodriguez, No. 06-CV-0855-KMW, at *2, *7, available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfrodriguezorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Efrosman, No. 05 Civ.8422 KMW, 2005 WL 3832923, at *1, 
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Pippin, No. CV 05-4120, 2005 WL 3741535, at *1, *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Nat’l Inv. Consultants, Inc., No. 05 2641, 2005 WL 3738410, at *1, *4 
(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
G7 Advisory Serv., No. Civ. 05-CV-80313, 2005 WL 3710161, at *1, *4 
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Int’l Currency Exch., Inc., No. 05-CV-8446-RCC, at *8 (S.D. N.Y. filed 
Oct. 14, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enficeorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. White Pine Trust Corp., No. 04-CV-2504-
JAH, at *2, *8 (S.D. Cal. filed Oct. 21, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enf-whitepinetrust-order.pdf; U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Next Fin. Serv. Unlimited, Inc., 
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No. 04-CV-80562-KLR, at *2, *8 (S.D. Fla. filed June 23, 2004), 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enfnext_financial-order.pdf 
(filed under seal); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Bibas 
Levy Corp., No. Civ. 03–22624, 2003 WL 23190190, at *1, *5 (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 20, 2003); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Emerald 
Worldwide Holdings Inc., No. CV03–8339, 2003 WL 23109216, at *1, 
*4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2003); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Int’l Foreign Currency, Inc., No. 00-1488, 2003 WL 
22410201, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2003); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Weinberg, No. 02-02094-CV-RSWL-RNB at *2, *8, 
available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/02orders/enfweinberg-sro.pdf; U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Rego Gainer Fin., Inc., No. 02-
1417-CV-DT-MCX, at *2-3, *7-8 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 19, 2002), 
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APPENDIX III: INFREQUENT ALTERNATIVES 
 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yanev, No. 2:05CV900, 2005 
WL 2991180, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2005); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Premium Income Corp., No. 05-CV-0416-JJ, at *2, 
*13 (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 2, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enf-premium-income-corp-order.pdf; 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Eustace, No. 05CV2973, 
2005 WL 3740316, at *1, *7 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2005); U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Am. Inv. Serv., Inc., No. 04-CV- —- -
DGP, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. filed June 10, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enffirstamerican-order.pdf; Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, No. Civ.A. 03 C 4346, 2003 WL 
22359573, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2003); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Orion Int’l, Inc., No. 03-CV-603-GD, at *2, *13 (D. 
Or. May 8, 2003), available at http://cftc.gov/files/enf/03orders/enforion-
sro.pdf; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Bristol Grp., Inc., 
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APPENDIX IV: CFTC DECISIONS THAT DO NOT CITE FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(d)(1) 
 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. People’s Alt., Inc., No. 
2:10-CV-07013-GAF, at *3, available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfpeoplesorder092210.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Driver, No. SA 09–cv–0578 ODW (RZx), 2009 WL 
3396172, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2009); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Cornerstone Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 07-CV-0274-
RWS, at *17-18 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 2007), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/leg
alpleading/enfcornerstoneorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Valko, No. 06-60001-CIV, 2006 WL 2620197, at *4 (S.D. 
Fla. Jan. 4, 2006); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Lake 
Dow Capital, LLC, No. 05-CV-2709, 2005 WL 3741510, at *6-7 (N.D. 
Ga. Oct. 19, 2005); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yanev, No. 
2:05CV900, 2005 WL 2991180, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2005); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cromwell Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 
Civ. 05-CV-210-JD, 2005 WL 3724872, at *2 (D.N.H. June 13, 2005); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Sonoma Trading Corp., No. 05-
60342, 2005 WL 3742849, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2005); Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Smithers, No. 05-CV-80592-DTKH, at *4 
(S.D. Fla. June 30, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfsmithersorder.pdf; U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Int’l Berkshire Grp. Holdings, Inc., No. 05-
CV-61588-CMA, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2005), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/05orders/enfberkshireassetfreezeorder.pdf; 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Lexington Royce & Assocs., 
No. 04 CV 02768, 2004 WL 856460, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004); 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schotz, No. 04-CV-8889-
SJO, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enf-schotz-sro.pdf; U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. First Liberty Grp., Inc., No. 04-CV-7609-
RWS, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004), available at 
http://cftc.gov/files/enf/04orders/enffirstliberty_order.pdf; U.S. 
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